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INTRODUCTION

The issue of judicial liability in civil actions' for various types
of wrongdoing has attracted recent interest as a result of the 1978
United States Supreme Court decision, Stump v. Sparkman.2 In
Stump, the Court held that an Indiana circuit judge who ordered
the sterilization of a minor solely on the ex parte petition of her
mother, without notice, hearing, or opportunity to appeal, was
immune from civil suit brought by the daughter. The decision has
been followed in a large number of cases, 3 but commentators
1. Explanation of the terminology of judicial liability and judicial immunity is required at the outset to minimize confusion. The customary but not exclusive usage of the
terms "liability," and, more commonly "immunity," concerns the possibility of being
subjected to a damage action. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978)
(citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871)). Of course, immunity from
suit is a fiction since a rule of law cannot prevent a plaintiff from filing suit but can only
provide a reduced probability of success on the merits. The issue here is the scope of the
rule of liability. In tort law, an immunity is a status that renders a person not liable when
another person, not possessing the status, would be liable. Basically, an immunity is a
defense that permits disposition of a suit at an early stage of the proceeding. For example,
under a rule of sovereign immunity, a tort action against a state may be dismissed without
any further examination of the facts. This is not the case with judicial "immunity" under
any version of the concept, because judicial immunity requires that the act complained
of be related to the judge's official duties, although the precise relation required is variously defined by different courts. Thus, a tort claim against a judge cannot be dismissed
solely on those facts; it must be determined that the judge's action was sufficiently related
to his judicial duties to invoke the "immunity" rule. This further determination is guided
by the liability standard. The judge may be viewed as having an immunity for acts that
are within the liability standard (that is, for all "judicial acts"), but the scope of the
inquiry necessary to determine whether the act complained of was "judicial" is so extensive that the term "immunity" seems misplaced. One could just as easily say that automobile drivers have an immunity for their actions when they exercise reasonable care; again,
the use of the term is not helpful. Nevertheless, because of the common use of the term
"judicial immunity" in both the case law and the literature, we refer to both "immunity"
and "liability" throughout.
2. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
3. E.g., McClain v. Brown, 587 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1978); Schuman v. California, 584
F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1978); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978); Kelsey v. Fitzgerald, 574 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1978); Strawbridge v. Bednarik, 460 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Holland v. Rubin, 460 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Adkins v. Adkins, 459 F.
Supp. 406 (S.D. W.Va. 1978); Prochaska v. Fediaczko, 458 F.Supp. 778 (W.D. Pa. 1978);
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unanimously have condemned the decision and have suggested
reform of the rules of judicial liability and judicial immunity.' We
agree that Stump was wrongly decided and that reform is needed,
but we do so for different reasons and with different results.
The most frequent justification offered for judicial immunity
is its alleged long-standing existence in Anglo-American common
law.5 A principal authority for this proposition is the century-old
precedent of Bradley v. Fisher,I in which Justice Stephen Field
stated that immunity "has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that
we are aware of, in the courts of this country." 7 Thus, we first
examine the history of judicial liability to determine if this reverence for the past is warranted. We conclude that statements such
as that in Bradley are inadequate history at two levels, reflecting
judicial misunderstanding of both what the law was and how and
why it developed. Actually, English law began with a positionof
general judicial liability and developed only limited exceptions
on grounds that are irrelevant to a discussion of judicial liability
today. When the English law was received in the United States,
Atcherson v. Siebenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Iowa 1978); Rankin v. Howard, 457 F.
Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978); Chalk v. Elliott, 449 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
On remand of Stump the Seventh Circuit held that because Judge Stump was immune and no other state action was shown, the conspiracy claim against the private
defendants (Mrs. McFarlin, her attorney, the doctors who performed the sterilization, and
the hospital) could not be brought on constitutional or other federal grounds. Sparkman
v. McFarlin, 601 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1979).
The importance of the issue of judicial liability also is shown by the large number of
suits against judges. In Pennsylvania, for example, about 150 suits were filed in 1978.
Philadelphia Bulletin, Aug. 13, 1979, at 3, col. 3.
4. See Nagel, Judicial Immunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 237
(1978); Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of JudicialImmunity, 64 VA. L.
Rxv. 833 (1978); Note, JudicialImmunity and JudicialMisconduct: A Proposalfor Limited Liability, 20 Amz. L. Rv. 549 (1978) [hereinafter cited as A Proposal for Limited
Liability]; Note, A Judge Can Do No Wrong: Immunity is Extended for Lack of Specific
Jurisdiction- Stump v. Sparkman, 27 DEPAUL L. Rv. 1219 (1978); 22 How. L.J. 129
(1979); 27 KANs. L. REv. 518 (1979). Articles prior to Stump include Kates, Immunity of
State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw.
U.L. REV. 615 (1970); Note, Immunity of Federaland StateJudges from Civil Suit - Time
for a Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W.L. Rv. 727 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Immunity
of Judges]; Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Liability of Judicial Officers].
5. E.g., W. PRossFR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF Tors 987 (4th ed. 1971)("judges
always have been accorded complete immunity for their judicial acts within the jurisdiction of courts .
6. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
7. Id. at 347.
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this limited immunity was expanded significantly, notably by

James Kent, to limit liability, and throughout the nineteenth
century a mixed pattern of judicial liability and immunity ex-

isted in America. In Bradley, Justice Field provided a confused
reformulation of the law, which led to a further limitation of
liability. At no point, however, were the advantages and disadvantages of judicial immunity fully examined.
Because the case for immunity is inconclusive and unpersuasive on historical grounds, we also examine the issue on policy
grounds; our analysis proceeds from a thorough review of the case
law and literature. We conclude that immunity is indefensible on
policy grounds as well, but that conclusion does not convince us

that any of the suggested reforms should be adopted. Instead, we
draw on contemporary jurisprudential thinking to argue that no

convincing policy resolution is possible. At that point, we express
our, own belief on the desirable response of courts to judicial liability cases, in the context of a broader conception of the past,
present, and future legal order.8
8. We are concerned exclusively with judicial immunity, not the immunity of other
public officials, although that topic also has received considerable attention in the recent
case law. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (except in extraordinary circumstances,
federal executive officials entitled only to limited, good-faith immunity); Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (state prison officials immune when unestablished constitutional right and only negligent conduct involved). See Nagel, supra note 4; see generally
K. DAvis, ADMINmTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEvENT E 573-98 (1972); K. DAvis, 3 AnMINLsTRATivE
LAw TREATisE 506-44 (1958); W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 987-92; Buxbaum, Liability of
Federal Officials in Damage for Acts Unconstitutionalor in Excess of Their Authority:
Expanding the Concept of the Rule of Law, 8 CAP. U.L. REv. 465 (1979); Jennings, Tort
Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. Rev. 263 (1937).
Although they are not the primary focus of our research, we can report some impressions on the relation between the immunity of judges and the immunity of other officials.
First, as our devotion to the history of judicial immunity should make obvious, the particular history of each type of immunity requires investigation. The literature of judicial
immunity includes scant reference to parallel imrhunities of other officials, suggesting that
they developed independently of each other. Second, that investigation may lead to the
discovery of links between the development of the various immunities. For example, in
our discussion of the immunity of the colonial and early federal magistracy, we note that
magistrates performed administrative as well as judicial functions; thus two bodies of law
were developing with respect to different functions of one group of officers. Third, because
the administrative and judicial systems are so dissimilar, the policy determination of an
appropriate rule of immunity must include different factors. The nature of the policy
analysis described in Part IV of this article is applicable to both, and we suggest that the
policy factors are as indeterminate and value-laden for nonjudicial as for judicial immunity. See generally Symposium - Civil Liability of Government Officials, 42 LAw & CON'-aP. PROB. 1 (1978).
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II.

JUDIciAL Limtrr IN ENGLAND

Most of the major judicial liability cases use the common-law
origins of judicial immunity as a justification for the doctrine. For
example, as noted above, Bradley v. Fisher,9 the case principally
relied on by the Court in Stump, 10 used an extensive discussion
of English case law to show the antiquity of the rule and to support its continued application.
In this section, we demonstrate that these conclusions about
English law simply are incorrect. A careful analysis of English law
shows that the basic rule was one of liability, that no simple rule
of immunity ever existed, and that application to American law
of those instances in which immunity was granted has been inappropriate. In sum, the English law provides little support for a
rule of absolute judicial immunity.11
A.

The Early Law

In earliest English law not only was immunity of judges not
recognized, but review of judicial decisions was in the form of a
personal action against the judge.2 The consequences of a false
judgment, a malicious judgment, or an action outside the judge's
authority were severe for the judge and the jurisdiction he represented. 3 Not until the fourteenth century did the courts distinguish between complaints against a judgment and complaints
against a judge." The source of this distinction, the special status
of the record of a court of record, is also one of the sources of the
modem doctrine of judicial immunity. Although the present im9. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347-49, 353.
10. 435 U.S. at 355-56.
11. The leading articles on the English law of judicial liability are Brazier, Judicial
Immunity and the Independence of the Judiciary, 1976 PuB. L. 397; Rubinstein, Liability
in Tort of Judicial Officers, 15 U. TORONTO L.J. 317 (1964), and Thompson, Judicial
Immunity and the Protectionof Justices,21 MoD. L. Rv. 517 (1958). Also useful are torts
treatises such as J. CLERK & W. LINDSELL, ToRTs 1108-18 (14th ed. 1975), and J. SALMOND,
LAW OF TORTS 416-30 (16th ed. 1973). A helpful specialized work is P. WINFIELD, Tan
PRESENT LAW OF ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (1921). The commentators frequently disagree
on what the law was or is, and we must therefore rely principally on original sources,

except for the discussion of the earliest law in text accompanying notes 12-18 infra.
12. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArILAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 668 (2d ed. 1899)

("The idea of a complaint against a judgment which is not an accusation against a judge
is not easily formed.").
13. 1 W. HOLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 213-15 (3d ed. 1945); 2 F. POLLOCK
& F. MArrLAND, supra note 12, at 664-69.
14. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 214.
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portance of that distinction is not great, in English law generally
and in the English law of judicial liability particularly, 5 the distinction was of considerable importance in shaping the law of
judicial immunity.
The special status of the record of a court of record had its
origin in the royal assertion that the King's word on events that
had taken place in his presence was indisputable. When this privilege was extended from the King to his judges, the court of record
was born and the foundation for limited judicial immunity was
set. Since the record of the court was incontrovertible, no party
could allege that an act noted therein was wrong, and thus the
source of the record - the judge - could not be subject to civil
or criminal liability for an abuse of power.
This interpretation, established by the middle of the fourteenth century," had as corollaries the notions that a judge of a
court not of record had no such protection and would be subject
to various actions at the hands of disappointed litigants, and that
the immunity of a judge of a court of record was limited to acts
within his jurisdiction.'" Acts outside his jurisdiction were unprotected by the record; in such cases, a judge was perceived to be
acting as a private person and therefore he could not assert immunity based on his official position.'" Thus, through the sixteenth century the common law provided a limited immunity for
a limited group of judges on the basis of a technical proposition
concerning the nature of the record of a court of record."
15. Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. 118 (C.A.).
16. 5 W. HoLDswoRrH, supra note 13, at 157-58; 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MArrLAND, supra
note 12, at 669.
17. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 235-36.

18. Id.
19. See Gwinne v. Poole, 125 Eng. Rep. 522 (C.P. 1692); Green and the Hundred of
Buccle-Churches Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 294 (C.P. 1589). Green was an action on the case
against a justice of the peace for refusing to examine a complainant who had raised the
hue and cry, resulting in a shipper being unable to recover goods stolen in a robbery.
Defendant's answer was that "the justice of the peace is a Judge of Record, and for such
thing as he doth as judge, no action lieth." 74 Eng. Rep. at 294. Plaintiff, recognizing the
validity of this defense, could only reply that in this instance the justice was not acting
as a judge of record, but rather as a minister appointed pursuant to statute for purposes
of examination. If defendant had been acting within his jurisdiction as a judge of record,
he would have been immune from suit despite any error in refusing to conduct the examination. The Court of Common Pleas in Gwinne defined more precisely the limits of the
judge's immunity, stating that the judge would be liable in trespass for actions outside
his jurisdiction if, at the time the cause of action arose, he was cognizant or might have
been cognizant but for his own misunderstanding of the facts that rendered the action
outside his jurisdiction.
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B.

The Law in the Time of Coke

The transformation of the law of judicial liability was begun
by Sir Edward Coke. The seventeenth century revision of the law
was based on the earlier technical distinction between courts of
record and courts not of record; however, it was motivated not
only by the extrapolation of that legal distinction, but also by the
contemporary political struggle of larger consequence."0 In two
leading cases in this area, Floyd v. Barker"'and The Case of the
Marshalseal the bearing of the political dispute on the law of
judicial liability is evident.
In Floyd, a judge of assize, Barker, presided at the murder
trial of William Price and, upon a verdict of guilty, gave judgment and sentenced Price to death. Subsequently, Barker was
charged in the Star Chamber with conspiracy. Coke held that
neither Barker nor others involved in the prosecution of Price
"ought to be charged with any conspiracy, in the Star Chamber,
or elsewhere, "2 and that "the said matters done at the Bar were
not examinable in the Star Chamber. ' '2 The immunity was total:
"And as a Judge shall not be drawn in question in the cases
aforesaid, at the suit of the parties, no more shall he be charged
'2
in the said cases before'any other Judge at the suit of the King.
His reasoning was related to the sanctity of a record on one hand
and to broader policy considerations on the other.
The record was a potent weapon to use in the political struggle because of the unimpeachable authority of its origins, the
King himself. Impugning the integrity of the record verged on
impugning the integrity of the monarch.2 Coke drew on the traditional basis for immunity, the record, and thereby provided the
law courts a dual advantage over their rivals, the Star Chamber
and other allies of the crown. First, no actions of a judge would
be subject to examination against the record in the Star Chamber
20. In addition to the stanlard histories, for an especially readable account see C.
BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE (1957). An important recent work is S. Wmrm, Sm
EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRiEvANCEs OF THE COMMONWEALTH," 1621-28 (1979).
21. 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607).
22. 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (C.P. 1610).
23. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1306.
24. Id. at 1307.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1306 ("And records are of so high a nature, that for their sublimity they
import verity in themselves; and none shall be received to aver anything against the record
itself."). See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra.
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or elsewhere. Furthermore, such protection would not be available to judges of the rival courts, such as the Star Chamber,
which were courts not of record. 2 Thus, Coke was able to use
effectively an ancient distinction based on the King's position
against the King himself.
Coke's analysis of judicial liability preserved the distinctions
of prior law. Judges of courts not of record still had no protection
against reexamination of their acts; Coke's example was a judge
of a hundred court.28 Moreover, because judges of courts of record
derived their immunity from the record, they had immunity for
certain judicial acts done outside the courtroom, but lost that
immunity for acts taken outside their judicial capacity.
[If he hath conspired before out of Court, this is extrajudicial;
but due examination of causes- out of Court, and inquiring by
testimony, et similia, is not any conspiracy, for this he ought to
do; but subornation of witnesses, and false and malicious prosecutions, out of Court, to such whom he knows will be indictors,
to find any guilty, &c. amounts to an unlawful conspiracy."
In short, Coke's analysis was based on the particular status of a
court of record and resulted in a formulation consistent with the
doctrine that a judge of a court of record was immune from suit
for all acts within the scope of the record, but like a judge of a
court not of record, was liable for all other acts for which he could
not invoke the protection of a record.
Coke introduced a new element into this area of the law by
explaining on policy grounds why a judge of a court of record was
entitled to immunity. One of his reasons is still today the principal policy argument advanced for judicial immunity - the potential for a multiplicity of suits, frivolous and otherwise, against
judges. Coke's statement of the problem is succinct: without a
rule of immunity, "there never will be an end of causes: but
controversies will be infinite .
".3.."0
The difficulty with this
formulation is identical to the difficulty with similar arguments
in later times; any rule other than an absolute rule of immunity
for all judges that gives no consideration to jurisdiction or the
nature of the act committed has the potential for generating suits
of great, if not "infinite," numbers.
27. 5 W. HoLswoRTH, supra note 13, at 159.

28. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1307.
29. Id. at 1306.
30. Id.
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Coke's second policy argument concerned the necessity of
maintaining respect for the judiciary and the government. The
origins of judicial office lay in the role of the monarch as the
dispenser of justice to his subjects." Even though the administration of justice had become formalized by the time of Coke, the
relationship between judges and King was still quite clear. For
Coke, because the administration of justice "concerns the honour
and conscience of the King, there is great reason that the King
himself shall take account of it, and no other."32 If the King's
judges were liable to answer to others inferior to the King (including, specifically, the Star Chamber), it would tend to the "slander
of the justice of the King.""' Thus, royal judges "are only to make
an account to God and the King." 34
Coke's second major opinion on judicial immunity followed
three years later in The Case of the Marshalsea, in which he
explored the limits of jurisdiction that developed out of the characterization of a court as a court of record. An act outside the
jurisdiction of the court, as noted in Floyd,3 was not considered
to be the action of a judge and therefore was not within the
record. An erroneous decision by a judge on a matter within his
jurisdiction, however, was viewed as a matter of record, and
therefore the judge was immune from suit for such a decision.
Coke gave the example of the Court of Common Pleas holding
plea in an appeal of felony and attainting the defendant as representative of an act coram non judice,1 which would render the
judge liable. Coke's example of an erroneous decision was a plea
of debt by the common pleas court awarding a capias against a
duke; this was illustrative of error because the law ptohibits issuance of a capias under these circumstances.38 The capias, though
void, arose in a matter within the court's jurisdiction, thus shielding the judge issuing the writ from liability. Coke preserved the
limitation of immunity from earlier law and his examples suggest
31. T. PLucKNEr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMoN LAW 139-56 (5th ed. 1956).
32. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1307.
33. Id
34. Id.
35. 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (C.P. 1610).
36. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1306.
37. The Latin phrase translates as "not in the presence of a judge" or "without
jurisdiction." The use of the Latin form of expression is evidence of the style and process
of judicial reasoning. We retain that usage deliberately to better convey the sense of the
process.
38. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1040.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw

[Vol. 31

that he also sought to preserve the qualification that a judge
would be immune only if he did not and could not know of the
facts limiting his jurisdiction.
Thus, the law of judicial liability at the time of Coke was
clear and simple. The basic principle was liability, not immunity.
A judge of a court not of record was liable for all his wrongful acts.
A judge of a court of record only was liable for wrongful acts
committed outside his authority. Following the seventeenth century formulation of those basic principles of judicial liability and
immunity, development proceeded along the following lines: (1)
further development of the distinction between abuse of jurisdiction and absence of jurisdiction and the related distinction between judicial and nonjudicial acts; (2) creation of the distinction
between superior and inferior courts; and (3) creation of the distinction between malicious and nonmalicious acts. We now discuss each of these points before returning to a summary review
of English law.
C.

The Law After Coke

1. Abuse and Absence of Jurisdiction.- The importance
of the distinction between abuse and absence of jurisdiction is
apparent when one considers that judicial immunity is a defense.
Once the law develops a body of tort rules that state when a
person will be liable in damages for injury caused to another and this development can be as basic as the limited generalization of the writs of trespass and case - then a judge, like any
other person, will be liable for his torts unless he is able to assert
an effective defense on the basis of his office. In English law, the
necessary elements of that defense were that the action causing
the injury was within the judge's jurisdiction, or if outside his
jurisdiction, that he did not know and had no facts before him to
suggest that it was outside his jurisdiction.3 1 While we will discuss
later"0 the analogous distinction between excess and absence of
jurisdiction drawn by the Court in Bradley v. Fisher,4' it is notable that the Bradley test is simultaneously more and less restric39. The elements of the defense were somewhat different for a superior court judge.
See notes 57-78 and accompanying text infra.
40. See notes 257-60 and accompanying text infra.
41. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351-53 (citing Calder v. Halket, 13 Eng. Rep. 12 (P.C. 1840),
and Ackerly v. Parkinson, 105 Eng. Rep. 665 (K.B. 1815)). See notes 257-59 and accompanying text infra.
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tive of liability and harder to reconcile with its premises than the
English rule.
The early common-law notion that a personal action would
not lie against a judge of a court of record for an error in judgment
within his jurisdiction continued to be the basic rule of immunity.
Since the source of this rule was the sanctity of the record of a
court of record, there was little discussion of any other basis for
the rule prior to the modern period, with the exception of Coke's
policy argument. 2 Further reasons are suggested in the leading
case, Hammond v. Howell, 3 in which the court held that the
nature of the judicial office required a judge to make decisions on
matters properly before him, rendering it inappropriate to sanction a judge for making an incorrect, though "judicially" proper,"
decision. This conclusion is especially valid, the court suggested,
because the harm caused by the mistaken action was, as it
usually is, remediable. 5
This analysis of the nature of the judicial office and the notion of jurisdiction appears to have been the basis for modifying
the rule of liability for judges of courts not of record. At some
point, by a process we have not been able to identify precisely,
judges of courts not of record were considered sufficiently similar
to other judicial officers to be accorded a protection for judicial
acts within their jurisdiction. This step in the development of the
law is usually glossed over in the cases and commentary, perhaps
because the answer is unclear." This development must have
occurred after the time of Coke,47 but probably was settled before
the series of nineteenth century cases discussed below."
The converse of the principle of immunity based on the judicial act of the judge within his jurisdiction was that a judge who
injured another by knowingly committing a wrongful act outside
42. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
*43. 86 Eng. Rep. 1035 (C.P. 1677).
44. Id. at 1037 ("Though the defendants here acted erroneously yet the contrary
opinion carried great colour with it, . . . so that they were mistaken, yet they acted
judicially, and for that reason no action will be against the defendant."). Defendant judges
had ordered the commitment of plaintiff, a jury member, for refusing, contrary to instructions, to convict Quakers indicted for riot.
45. The wrongful order of commitment could be corrected by the Barons in Exchequer refusing to issue process on it. Id. at 1036.
46. See, e.g., 6 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 13, at 235-37; Thompson, supra note 11,
at 526-28.
47. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
48. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text infra.
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his jurisdiction could not assert a defense on the basis of his
office. Essentially, a judge in such a case was unable to establish
the elements of the defense required by the basic rule. Yet the
underlying reason for this limit to the defense was the formalistic
and definitional idea that a judge acted as judge only when he
exercised the functions assigned to him by law. If a judge exceeded his authority, not only was his act coram non judice9 and
therefore void, but it was also considered the act of a private
person. The recitation of this analysis in numerous cases" is formulaic, but sensible; when the judge knowingly acted outside his
jurisdiction, it would have been difficult for the law to be consistent in allowing him to assert his judicial status as a defense.
The intermediate case between erroneous judgment clearly
within the jurisdiction of the court and knowing action in the
absence of jurisdiction provided the opportunity to test the extent
to which the law was being shaped by mechanical application of
formal concepts and the extent to which it was being shaped by
instrumental concern for the underlying objectives. When a judge
exceeded his jurisdiction without actual or constructive knowledge of the facts that would indicate the absence of jurisdiction,
the English courts'at an early point permitted the judge to plead
his lack of knowledge of jurisdictional facts as a valid defense.
Gwinne v. Poole,5" the earliest reported judicial immunity decision, is generally regarded as the seminal case for the doctrine
ignorantia facti excusat - ignorance of the jurisdictional facts
excuses the lack of jurisdiction.5 2 Following Gwinne, there was a
considerable gap before a series of nineteenth-century cases further articulated the principle and its effects.
In one such case, Pike v. Carter,5" defendant was a justice of
the peace who asserted jurisdiction over a dispute that was not
within his jurisdiction due to a statutory exception. At the first
hearing on the matter before the justice, one of the parties appeared as defendant but did not raise the exception; at a second
hearing, none of the defendants appeared. When the defendants
in the first case attempted to bring an action of trespass against
49. See note 37 supra.
50. E.g., Moravia v. Sloper, 125 Eng. Rep. 1039 (C.P. 1737); Terry v. Huntington,
145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Ex. 1668).
51. 125 Eng. Rep. 523 (C.P. 1566). See note 19 supra.
52. Again, the Latin form is retained as particularly evocative.
53. 130 Eng. Rep. 443 (C.P. 1825). See also Calder v. Halket, 13 Eng. Rep. 12 (P.C.
1840); Lowther v. Earl of Radnor, 103 Eng. Rep. 287 (K.B. 1806).
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the justice, the court held the action would not lie, Lord Chief
Justice Best stating: "an action of trespass will not lie against a
public officer for any thing which, in the discharge of his duty,
he has been called on to do, without an opportunity having been
afforded him of judging of all the circumstances under which he
is to act. . ...
,5 The court's decision is closely tied to the rationale for the basic rule of immunity expressed in Hammond v.
Howell - the necessity of exercise of judgment 5 Without the
facts necessary for exercising judgment or any reasonable means
of obtaining those facts, the judge could not be liable.
This principle was limited to ignorantiafacti and was not
extended to ignorantiajuris - ignorance of the law. A judge was
presumed to know, or at least was obligated to ascertain, the law.
When facts indicating an absence of jurisdiction were before the
judge, he could not claim immunity from liability for misapplying
those facts. In Houlden v. Smith,56 for example, the facts showed
that the plaintiff resided and worked outside the jurisdiction 6f
the court, but the judge erroneously believed that he had jurisdiction to commit plaintiff for contempt for refusing to obey a summons. The judge's misapplication of the law governing jurisdiction was not a ground for immunity and he was found liable in
trespass.
There is some inconsistency between the treatment of ignorance of fact and ignorance of law. In a formal sense, the judge is
acting no more judicially when he lacks jurisdiction but does not
know it because of his ignorance of the jurisdictional facts than
when he lacks jurisdiction but does not realize it because of his
mistaken opinion of the law. The only explanation for the distinction is the lack of opportunity available to the judge in the first
situation to discover his error; in the second situation, however,
the opportunity is present and thus his failure to do so may be
his own fault. The existence of this inconsistency suggests that
although the underpinnings of the law are formal concepts, the
development of the law also was shaped by responses to equities
presented by particular situations and their relation to the policies inherent in the concepts. This conflict continued to shape the
law, even for modern judges who arguably are more sophisticated
than their common-law predecessors.
54. 130 Eng. Rep. at 445.
55. 86 Eng. Rep. 816 (C.P. 1677). See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
56. 117 Eng. Rep. 323 (Q.B. 1850).
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2. Superiorand Inferior Courts. - The notion that judicial
immunity is based on jurisdiction, or at least based on jurisdiction as it reasonably could have been determined at the time of
the act complained of, was important in the development of a
second distinction. That distinction, rather obscure for purposes
of judicial immunity, was between superior courts and inferior
courts. The cases already discussed distinguished between courts
of record and courts not of record, but English law through the
mid-seventeenth century drew no distinction between superior
and inferior courts. 7 At that point, the courts began to approach
such a distinction. The process was gradual, and the results uncertain, but examination of the issue is crucial because the notion
of a superior court later would be transported to the United
States, incorrectly interpreted, and made a basis for a broad judicial immunity. 8
Holdsworth has suggested59 that two sources of the distinction between superior and inferior courts lay in Coke's analysis
of judicial liability in The Case of the Marshalsea ° and Floyd v.
Barker.8" First, because the jurisdiction of a superior court is not
limited, the law presumes that nothing is outside the jurisdiction
of such a court except as specially appears, and the court itself
may determine its own jurisdiction. Accordingly, an erroneous
conclusion concerning jurisdiction by a court that has power to
determine its own jurisdiction is an abuse of jurisdiction, not an
act in absence of jurisdiction, and thus it imports immunity from
suit under the basic rule of immunity. On the other hand, an
inferior court has no authority to determine its own jurisdiction
and a wrong decision by it concerning its jurisdiction is an act in
absence of jurisdiction, not an abuse of jurisdiction, and thus
there is no immunity. Second, a judge of an inferior court is
answerable to a superior court by prohibition or other process for
acts in absence of jurisdiction, but superior court judges answer
only to God and King. Thus, judges of the latter type of court,
but not the former, are immune from suit in another court for acts
in absence of jurisdiction.
57. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 238.

58.
59.
60.
61.
supra.

See notes 158-65 and accompanying text infra.
6 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 238-39.

77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (C.P. 1610). See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607). See notes 23-34 and accompanying text
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Holdsworth, like others, uses the terms "superior" and
"inferior" in an ambiguous manner.2 In his first point, he defines
a superior court as one presumed to have jurisdiction in all cases.
His second use of the term is to describe a court that is not subject
to prohibition. The two definitions are not coextensive, the second use of the term being more limited than the first. Other
commentators have offered different definitions of superior and
inferior courts. 3 To understand the meaning of the concepts in
the judicial liability context, we turn to the case law.
The first case that suggested the present distinction between
superior and inferior courts, although not an immunity case, was
Peacock v. Bell,64 which involved a complaint in the Court of
County Palatine of Durham. The complaint did not state specifically that the defendant had been indebted at a place within the
jurisdiction of the court. The King's Bench held the complaint to
be good because the palatine court was a superior court, so the
action would be presumed to be within the jurisdiction of the
court. The palatine court was a superior court, even though it was
inferior to the courts at Westminster and could be restrained by
prohibition," because executions on its judgments could not be
stayed by writ of error without security. Although not an immunity case, Peacock v. Bell is important because it usually is cited
for the proposition that a superior court has unlimited jurisdiction. 6 In this different context, the King's Bench used the
broader interpretation of superior court.
Terry v. Huntington 7 was the first judicial immunity case to
address the distinction between inferior and superior courts.
Chief Baron Hale held that remedial action, including actions
against judges in appropriate cases, was available for errors committed outside the jurisdiction of a court for all courts except the
62. See Thompson, supra note 11, at 520-23.
63. E.g., EARL OF HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 11-13 (1909). Halsbury enumerates the following contemporary courts he defines as superior courts: House of Lords,
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Supreme Court of Judicature, Court of Criminal
Appeal, and Courts of Chancery of Counties Palatine of Lancaster and Durham; presumably their predecessors also were superior courts. The limited enumeration suggests the
limits of the definition.
64. 85 Eng. Rep. 84 (K.B. 1667).
65. Thompson, supra note 11, at 523.
66. E.g., Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. 118, 138 (C.A.) (Buckley, L.J.); P. WINFIELD,
supra note 11, at 211 n.3.
67. 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Exch. 1668) (action in trover and conversion of goods for acts
of the commissioners of excise in levying beyond their authority).
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"King's courts at Westminster.""8 This decision suggests a restricted view of which courts are superior courts, including only
a few royal courts.
This narrow view was echoed in Taaffe v. Downes,"'which is
usually cited as one of the leading cases stating a rule of absolute
immunity for superior court judges. 0 The court's definition of
"superior court" was quite narrow indeed, consistent with the
view in Terry v. Huntington that only the King's judges at Westminister were entitled to so high a status. Taaffe was an action
in trespass for assault and false imprisonment on a warrant
against William Downes, Lord Chief Justice of the Court of
King's Bench in Ireland. The Court of Common Pleas in Ireland
held that the action would not lie, stating reasons characteristic
of such cases, including the relation of the judges to the King,
judicial independence, and the prevention of vexatious suits. Justice Mayne drew the distinction between superior and inferior
courts:
The difference between the Judges of the superior and inferior
courts has not been sufficiently attended to. The King's Judges
stand next to, or with the King, or for him, appointed by him,
and responsible to him; and he will have his justice done by
them, and by them alone. The inferior Judges stand under, and
represent the authority of subjects; they have only the responsible power of subjects entrusted to them; or they are placed at a
distance in responsibility from the King, and are subject to the
control and direction of the superior Courts. An action before
one Judge for what is done by another, is in the nature of an
Appeal; and is the Appeal from an equal to an equal."
In this and subsequent passages, the court made clear that
only the judges who "stand next to, or with the King"72 were the
highest royal judges. Inferior judges "are subject to the control
and direction of the superior Courts," presumably by writ of
prohibition, writ of error, or other means of judicial control. The
final sentence quoted above indicates that only the few judges
who are "equals" are granted the immunity. Actions could be
68. 145 Eng. Rep. at 559.
69. 13 Eng. Rep. 15 (C.P. Ireland 1813).
70. E.g., Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. 118, 146-47 (C.A.) (Ormrod, L.J.); J. CLERK
& W. LINDSELL, supra note 11, at 1110 n.20.
71. 13 Eng. Rep. at 17-18.
72. Id. at 18.

73. Id.
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brought "in the nature of an Appeal" before high court judges to
review the decisions of many inferior judges, and all of those in
the latter category lacked judicial immunity. Superior judges,
however, answered only in "the high Court of Parliament" for
their conduct.7 4 The advancement of this argument was especially
easy in this case, since the court repeatedly emphasized the
unique position of the defendant, the Chief Justice of King's
Bench in Ireland, who possessed the most general jurisdiction of
any judge; this position contrasts sharply with that of a justice
of the peace, an officer of limited and defined jurisdiction. Finally, another specific indication of the court's interpretation is
the statement of Justice Mayne,7" reviewing the authorities, that
no action against a judge was ever sustained and only two such
actions were ever attempted, one against the Lord Lieutenant of
Ireland 76 and one in King's Bench in England." Justice Mayne
could not have been ignorant of the numerous actions against
lower judges prior to 1813 heretofore discussed and the inescapable implication is that he referred only to actions against high
court judges.
The foregoing discussion of the distinction between superior
and inferior courts should not be considered definitive. The law
from the seventeenth century forward was somewhat confused, in
part because of the paucity of cases in the area, especially cases
involving superior court judges. This confusion is, however, important for our purposes, because it could not have permitted an
easy adoption of English law in the United States; the English
law was just not that straightforward. Holdsworth is instructive:
I think that, at the end of the seventeenth century, the courts
were feeling their way to the distinction upon which the total
immunity of the judges of the superior courts rests; but that the
gradual way in which it was being arrived at prevented any very
74. Id. at 23 (Fox, L.J.).
75. Id. at 18 (Mayne, J.).
76. This case apparently is unreported.
77. Hammond v. Howell, 86 Eng. Rep. 1035 (C.P. 1677). Hammond often is cited as
authority for absolute judicial immunity. In Hammond, the judicial officer had general

subject-matter jurisdiction over the cause before him, but misapplied the law in ordering
the commitment of a jury member. Although the judge had the authority to punish a
misdemeanor of a jury member in such a manner, he erroneously found that a misdemeanor had been committed. Thus, the court's broad language concerning the immunity
of judges has little relevance to the question of whether a judge is immune for acts
committed in absence of jurisdiction.
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clear apprehension of its juridical bases . . . .Indeed, though
we get statements of this rule in the eighteenth century, I doubt
whether we get any very clear statement of its juridical basis
until . . . 1867 . .

.78

3. Malicious and Nonmalicious Acts. - The final distinction to be developed in English law was between malicious and
nonmalicious acts within the jurisdiction of a judge. 7 This later
distinction reflected in part the earlier distinction between superior and inferior courts.
The question of liability for malicious acts arose most frequently with inferior judges and other lower judicial officers, particularly justices of the peace; the absolute immunity of superior
court judges extended even to acts done maliciously."0 Although
there is considerable disagreement on this proposition,8' we conclude that inferior judges were liable for malicious acts within
their jurisdiction.82 This liability developed in part to deal with
malfeasance by election officials acting in a judicial capacity,",
but it was extended to all inferior judges. 4 The basic principle
was summarized in Taylor v. Nesfield: 5 "If the act of a magistrate is done without jurisdiction, it is a trespass; if within the
jurisdiction, the action rests upon the corruptness of the motive;
8
and, to establish this, the act must be shewn to be malicious.1
The rules regarding malice have a two-fold origin. First, the
notion apparently existed that a malicious act as much as an act
in absence of jurisdiction could be characterized as coram non
judice and therefore unprotected. Second, the rule concerning
78. 6

W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 239-40.

79. Malicious acts outside a judge's jurisdiction are treated the same as nonmalicious
acts.
80. P. WINFIELD, supra note 11, at 207; Rubinstein, supra note 11, at 329. There seem
to have been no actions brought against superior court judges on this ground, which is
itself some support for the proposition.
81. See generally Sirros v. Moore, [1975] 1 Q.B. 118, 132 (C.A.) (Lord Denning,
M.R.); P. WINFIELD, supra note 11, at 207, 216-19; Rubinstein, supra note 11, at 326-30;
Thompson, supra note 11, at 526-33.
82. See also Rubinstein, supra note 11, at 331-32.
83. See Drewe v. Colton, 102 Eng. Rep. 217 (Launceston Assize 1787) (citing Ashby
v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703), as reversed in the House of Lords, 1 Eng. Rep.

417 (H.L. 1703)).
84. The Justices Protection Acts, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 95-102,
contemplate an action for malice. Thompson, supra note 11, at 520-24, argues that lower
judges were immune when acting of record.
85. 118 Eng. Rep. 1312 (K.B. 1854) (Erle, J.).
86. Id. at 1314.
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malice developed as an adjunct to the doctrine ubi jus, ibi
remedium - where there is a right, there is a remedy. Chief
Justice Holt's dissenting opinion in Ashby v. White17 has been
described as the zenith of the influence of this principle"8 and the
adoption of his dissent by the House of Lords in reversing the
decision of King's Bench 8 added considerable weight to that position. In any event, the rule concerning malice continued in English law and was carried over into American law. 9'
D. The English Law in Perspective
Before turning from the doctrinal development of the English
law to the influence of that law in America, we can generalize
about the conditions motivating much of the development. In
England, as later would be the case in the United States,82 perhaps the busiest government officials and those closest to the
lives of the folk were the local magistrates.93 In turn, many, probably most, of the actions against judges through the nineteenth
century were brought against justices of the peace; this in large
part reflects their important role in the administration of justice
and general governance during the period. The importance of
their role and the unavailability of other means of redress94 necessitated the limitation of immunity as a protection for the people.
Lord Justice Ormrod's judgment in Sirros v. Moore noted both
this fact and the nature of the response: "In many situations the
law provided no other form of remedy, and the courts used this
one [i.e., civil liability] so vigorously that Parliament had to
intervene on several occasions to temper the wind to the shorn
lamb."9 Additionally, the central judges may have had less sym87. 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 134 (Q.B.1703) (Holt, C.J., dissenting).
88. Rubinstein, supra note 11, at 317.
89. See note 83 supra.
90. See, e.g., Linford v. Fitzroy, 116 Eng. Rep. 1255 (Q.B. 1849); Burley v. Bethune,
128 Eng. Rep. 816 (C.P. 1814); Morgan v. Hughes, 100 Eng. Rep. 123 (K.B. 1788). The
Justices Protection Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 44, § 1 contemplates actions for malice.
See also Thompson, supra note 11, at 524-33.
91. See notes 192-205 and accompanying text infra.
92. See notes 210-18 and accompanying text infra.
93. C.BEARD, THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE IN ENGLAND 155, 165 (1904;
AMS ed. 1967); 4 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 13, at 144, 165. Beard describes the justices'
constituency as "the lower orders of society, who had neither the money, the influence,
nor the ability to bring their causes to the notice of the crown." C. BEARD, supra, at 155.
94. C. BEARD, supra note 93, at 151.

95. [1975] 1 Q.B. at 149.
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pathy for the local justices and could less readily regard them as
true judges, entitled to some of the prerequisites of that station,
including immunity from suit."6 The royal courts may also have
found liability to be a useful tool in asserting central authority
over the local justices.
Parliament's response was a series of acts regulating the
manner in which a civil action could be brought against a justice,
although the substantive rules of liability were not changed. The
earliest of these was enacted in 1609 and was designed to deter
"causeless and contentious suits" brought by "evil-disposed and
contentious persons."97 The preamble of the Act of 1751 illustrates the duality of the problem, protection of the justices and
protection of the people:
Whereas Justices of the Peace are discouraged in the Execution
of their Office by vexatious Actions brought against them for or
by reason of small and involuntary errors in their Proceedings:
And whereas it is necessary that they should be (as far as is
consistent with Justice, and the Safety and Liberty of the Subjects over whom their Authority extends) rendered safe in the
Execution of the said office and trust: and whereas it is also
necessary that the Subjects should be protected from all wilful
and aggressive abuse of the several Laws and Statutes committed to the Care and Execution of the said Justices of the Peace
98

The remedies and procedures provided by the acts included the
assessment of double costs against a losing plaintiff,9 the requirement of written notice to a defendant justice at least one month
before any action was brought, during which time the justice
could offer a settlement to the party and pay the offered sum into
the custody of the court,' 0 and the limitation of damages to nominal amounts for certain wrongful acts except when done
"maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause."''
The Justices Protection Act of 1848102 continued the proce96. Cf. notes 210-22 and accompanying text infra.
97. Justices Protection Act, 1609, 7 Jac. 1, c. 5.
98. Justices Protection Act, 1751, 24 Geo. 2, c. 44. The protection of this Act was
accorded to justices of the peace in Georgia when the Georgia Supreme Court held that

the Act had been received into the law of Georgia. Warthen v. May, 1 Ga. 602 (1846).
99. Justices Protection Act, 1609, 7 Jac. 1, c. 21.
100. Justices Protection Act, 1751, 24 Geo. 2, c. 44.
101. Justices Protection Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 141.
102. Justices Protection Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 44.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss2/4

20

1980]

Feinman and Cohen:SUING
Suing Judges:
History and Theory
JUDGES

dures of the earlier acts and, for our purposes, demonstrates the
substantive rules of liability. Section 1 of the Act, providing that
actions alleging acts by a justice "done maliciously, and without
reasonable and probable cause"'' 3 could be brought in case, demonstrates the lack of immunity for malicious acts. Section 2, providing that actions alleging acts by a justice "in a matter of which
by law he has not Jurisdiction, or in which he shall have exceeded
his Jurisdiction"104 could be maintained as previously provided by
law, demonstrates the jurisdictional basis of immunity.
A brief review of the English law of judicial liability through
the nineteenth century provides a perspective for the examination of the area in American law. The earliest English law provided for judicial liability. When a rule of immunity developed,
it began and remained a limited exception to a general rule of
liability to suit. The exception was based on formal notions of the
judicial process and judicial office, as well as political considerations, although it later was justified by reference to policy issues.
The policy arguments, however, were of limited force, and the
exception never was extended very far. Most of those performing
judicial functions continued to be liable for erroneous acts outside
their jurisdiction even if done in good faith, and for malicious
acts. This liability was regarded as a necessary check on improprieties in the administration of justice, although at times even
this check had to be counterbalanced by legislative action. The
necessity for legislative action itself illustrates the scope of liability.
HI.

JUDICIAL Li4smrry IN THE UNITED STATES

Most jurisdictions in the United States relied heavily on
English law in creating their own law of judicial liability, but the
American development was not uniform and diverged from the
English law at several junctures. In the colonial period, there was
little law on the subject, or at least little that is left to be discovered. 0 5 Following independence, an American law was articulated, based largely on the English law, particularly by James
Kent in Yates v. Lansing.0 Kent's interpretation was an adapta103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See notes 114-25 and accompanying text infra.
106. 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810), affl'd, 9 Johns. 395 (N.Y. 1811). See notes 11657 and accompanying text infra.
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tion of the English law to the American circumstance in a way
that broadened significantly the scope of immunity. The acceptance of a broad immunity, however, was far from uniform. The
states exhibited considerable diversity on the rules applicable to
lower judicial officers who were, as in England, treated much
differently than higher judges." 7 Again, as in Efigland, the lower
judges were most subject to suit, and for many of them the rule
was one of liability for extrajurisdictional acts, malicious acts, or
both. Following this period of mixed development, Justice Field's
opinion in Bradley v. Fisher' was enormously influential in recasting the doctrinal analysis of state courts, as well as their
general approach to problems in this area.' 9 By the early twentieth century, the law had begun to shift from a basic position of
liability to a preference for immunity, although the culmination
of the change was very recent."' Stump v. Sparkman is the most
extreme example of the trend toward immunity. Almost incidentally, Congress played what turned out to be a minor part in the
story, attempting to provide a statutory cause of action for judicial wrongdoing in the Civil Rights Act of 1871,1" but its attempt
was subverted by the Supreme Court's obvious misinterpretation
of that provision in Piersonv. Ray. 1 2 We will detail this historical
outline and then provide a synthetic interpretation of the American development." 3
107. For higher judges, see notes 158-65 and accompanying text infra. For lower
judges, see notes 166-205 and accompanying text infra. The terms "higher" and "lower"
judge are deliberately imprecise, to reflect the imprecision in the law. See notes 158-65
and accompanying text infra.
108. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
109. See notes 285-94 and accompanying text infra.
110. See notes 300-06 and accompanying text infra.
111. 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
112. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Since the Court held in Pierson that judges are immune
from § 1983 actions, several commentators have concluded that the Court incorrectly
interpreted the statute, which was intended to provide a federal cause of action against
state judges. The basis for that conclusion, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts
of 1871 and 1866, has been fully explored in the commentary. Advocates of the Acts viewed
Southern judges as a major part of the problem to which the legislation was directed, and
both advocates and opponents foresaw judges being liable to suit after passage of the
Acts. Kates, supra note 4, at 621-23; Immunity of Judges, supra note 4, at 738-40;
Liability of Judicial Officers, supra note 4, at 327-29. The Pierson court was not unaware
of the, legislative history, which was explained in Brief for Petitioners, at 19-26, and in
Justice Douglas' dissent, 386 U.S. at 559-63.
113. See notes 206-45 and accompanying text infra.
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A. The Colonial Period
For the law of judicial liability, as for other areas of law, the
colonial period is "the dark ages of American law.""' The published primary sources of colonial law reveal no law of judicial
liability or judicial immunity'1 5 and the secondary literature reveals little more. Given the scarcity of sources generally,"' s this is
not surprising, nor should it be much cause for concern. Whatever
the colonial law or practice was, it had almost no effect on the
subsequent law. Later courts referred to English authorities but
never referred to the colonial experience.
One would not expect a law of judicial liability to have developed in the earliest colonial period. Such law, almost by definition, requires a structure of government more developed than the
unitary systems common at the founding of the colonies." 7 Relatively quickly, however, most of the colonies developed governmental organizations almost surprising in complexity." 8 At that
point, parties aggrieved by actions of judicial officers had an alternative forum in which to seek a remedy. Further, in prerevolutionary America at least, ensuring the rights of the people by
providing checks on official behavior, especially the behavior of
officials with as broad judicial and administrative power as local
judges,"' was an issue of general popular moment.' Thus, actions at common law frequently were the vehicles for attacking
official impropriety,' including even alleged usurpations by the
imperial authorities.

21

In at least two colonies for which indirect

evidence exists, however, it appears that judges both high and low
were immune from such suits.I2 Possibly, the explanation for this
114.
115.
116.
HISTORY
117.
118.
(1960).
119.

L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 29 (1973).
See note 123 infra.
See Flaherty, An Introductionto EarlyAmerican Legal History, in ESSAYS INTHE
OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 3 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969).
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 32-34; 38-39.
Id. at 34-40. See G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS
See R. IRELAND, THE CoUNTY COURTS IN ANTEBELLUM KENTUCKY 1-2 (1972); W.

NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE ComoN LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSA-

1760-1830, at 14-18 (1975).
120. W. NELSON, supra note 119, at 13-18.
121. Id. at 17-18; Nelson, Officeholding and Powerwielding:An Analysis of the Relationship between Structure and Style in American Administrative History, 10 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 187, 192 (1976).
CHUSETS SOCIETY,

122. See J. REID, IN A DEFIANr STANCE: THE CONDITIONS OF LAW IN MASSACHUSEITS
BAY, THE IRISH COMPARISON, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-40 (1977).

123. In seventeenth century New York the Court of Assizes was "frequently plagued
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is the elite status of most judges," 4 but William E. Nelson's contention that the elite colonial magistrates treated their offices in
a personal manner 25 suggests that they should have been subject
to a rule of personal liability, similar to that applied to their
brethren in other official posts. The lack of evidence suggests that
such actions were brought rarely, if at all, whether prohibited by
law or merely by custom.
B. From Independence to Bradley v. Fisher
Beginning about the turn of the nineteenth century, the
American law of judicial liability expanded. The period from then
until the Supreme Court's decision in Bradley v. Fisher can be
treated as a unit. Within that period, we separate the discussion
on doctrinal lines, discussing first the law of judicial liability for
the higher judges' 26 and then turning to the law for lower judges,
describing first the general rules and then the treatment of extrajurisdictional and malicious acts.
1. Superior Courts. - Throughout this period, superior
court judges were treated as immune from civil liability for their
judicial acts. The case that principally established this proposition and shaped the law of judicial liability generally was Yates
v. Lansing.'2 The litigation involved several public figures, the
by the petitions of unsuccessful litigants who demanded that local judges be censured or
removed because of decisions adverse to the petitioners" and refused to hear any such
petitions after 1681, only permitting relief by appeal. No mention is made of damage
actions. Johnson, The Advent of Common Law in New York, in LAW AND AuHoRrry m
COLONIAL AMERICA 74, 79 (G. Billias ed. 1965).

In Massachusetts judges were immune from suit. W. NELsON, supra note 119, at 17
n.51. Nelson cites an unreported case that holds justices of the peace liable for certain
official misconduct, but the example given is a ministerial act, not a judicial act. Id.
The Pennsylvania Provincial Council in 1683 fined the Philadelphia County Court for
giving judgment in an action of ejectment when the county court did not have jurisdiction
because the land in question was situated in another county. Noble v. Man, 1 Penny. Col.
Cas. 27 (1683). Samuel W. Pennypacker, who collected and published the Pennsylvania
colonial cases in 1892, commented that "the race of judges who held that a fine should be
imposed upon the court for giving judgment against the law soon perished, no successors
arose who accepted this view, and the principle failed to become established as a part of
our jurisprudence." Id. at 28.
124. Nelson, supra note 121, at 192-94.
125. Id. at 194-97.
126. See note 107 supra.
127. 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810), affl'd, 9 Johns. 326 (N.Y. 1811). The usual
citation is to Kent's majority opinion in 5 Johns. 282. Yates was one of four reported
decisions generated by the extensive litigation of this matter. See In re Yates, 4 Johns.
317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809), reu'dsub. nom, Yates v. People, 6 Johns. 229 (N.Y. 1810); Yates
v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810), affl'd, 9 Johns. 326 (N.Y. 1811).
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three highest courts of the state, and important public issues
including not only judicial liability, but also the protection of
personal freedoms from judicial oppression and the right of habeas corpus.'2
The matter first arose when John Yates, a master in chancery, filed a complaint on behalf of another person to which he
signed the name of Peter Yates, a solicitor, instead of his own
name and then acted as solicitor in the action, all without Peter
Yates' knowledge or consent and in violation of law. Upon discovering this deception, Chancellor John Lansing, Jr. issued a writ
of attachment ordering John Yates arrested for malpractice and
contempt. Immediately after his arrest, Yates sought and received from Supreme Court Justice Ambrose Spencer a writ of
habeas corpus discharging him because the attachment for malpractice was illegal. Chancellor Lansing ordered Yates recommitted, saying the discharge was illegal, despite a New York statute129 that arguably prohibited such a recommittal following issuance of a habeas corpus. 3 '
In its first opinion in the dispute, the supreme court upheld
the validity of the chancellor's order to recommit and held the
order of discharge void,1 31 but the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors reversed.' 32 Subsequently,
Yates brought an action of debt against Lansing for recovery of
the penalty assessed in the habeas corpus act.' 33 Lansing pleaded
the lawfulness of his act and his judicial office as defenses. Yates
demurred to the plea, and the supreme court overruled the demurrer and entered judgment for Lansing.' 3' On writ of error to
3
the court of errors, the supreme court's decision was affirmed.'
Kent's supreme court opinion in Yates' damage action against
Lansing was the opinion that established the American law of
judicial liability.136 To interpret the relevant statute, Kent turned
128. The contemporary significance of the controversy is shown by the length of the
opinions delivered. The four decisions cited in note 127 supra, including arguments of
counsel, total 305 pages in Johnson's Reports.
129. 1801 N.Y. Laws, c. 65, based on 31 Car. II, c.2 (1660).
130. In re Yates, 4 Johns. at 318-19.
131. Id. at 317.
132. Yates v. People, 6 Johns. 229 (N.Y. 1810).
133. 1801 N.Y. Laws, c. 65, 5.
134. Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
135. 9 Johns. 326 (N.Y. 1811).
136. Kent noted the earlier decision that the Chancellor's order to recommit was
lawful, but he discussed the case assuming arguendo that the order was not lawful. He
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to the English law of judicial liability. Kent's attraction to and
facility with English precedents are well known'17 and those qualities are evident in this opinion.
In his statement of the basic law, Kent used the English
distinction between superior and inferior courts.
Where courts of special and limited jurisdiction exceed their
powers, the whole proceeding is coram non judice, and all concerned in such void proceedings are held to be liable in trespass
..

.

.But I believe this doctrine has never been carried so far

as to justify a suit against the members of the superior courts
of general jurisdiction for any act done by them in a judicial
capacity. 3 '
Kent praised the "deep root" of this principle at common law and
"the wisdom of our forefathers" in establishing it, discussing a
variety of English authorities from the Yearbooks to Mansfield.
He concluded by citing the general immunity language of Phelps
v. Sill,'" which frequently is regarded as the first American judicial liability case, and asking rhetorically whether any sound
reading of the habeas corpus act would subvert "such a sacred
principle of the common law" as judicial immunity in the absence
of clear legislative expression.'
The court of errors"' upheld Kent's decision by a vote of
fourteen to five."' The principal opinion for the majority, presented by Senator Platt, essentially mirrored Kent's opinion
below." 3 In particular, Platt repeated Kent's rule of immunity for
judges of general jurisdiction and limited immunity for judges of
special or limited jurisdiction."'
The contrary opinion was presented by Senator (later Governor) DeWitt Clinton. Clinton emphasized the legal and policy
also assumed that Yates' malpractice was within the jurisdiction of the court of chancery
to punish. 5 Johns. at 288-89.
137. J. HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM, 1763-1847, at 147-48, 152-54
(DaCapo ed. 1969); see M. HoRwrrz,THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860
at 9 (1977).
138. 5 Johns. at 290.
139. 1 Day 315 (Conn. 1804).
140. 5 Johns. at 296.
141. The New York Court of Errors was composed of the Chancellor, the judges of
the Supreme Court, and the members of the Senate. N.Y. CONST. art.XXXII (1777).
142. 9 Johns. at 396.
143. Platt discussed at greater length than Kent the lawfulness of Lansing's order of
recommitment. Id. at 414-20.
144. Id. at 424.
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limits on the chancellor's authority as limits on his immunity.
Because no court in England or America had "jurisdiction coextensive with every object of judicial cognizance," no court's jurisdiction could be unlimited and no judge could be above answering
for acts beyond the limits of his jurisdiction."' According to Clinton, giving superior courts absolute immunity would create a distinction without reason between those courts and inferior courts
and would invest superior courts with too much power over the
rights of the people."' Impeachment alone was too uncertain a
47
remedy to protect those rights and, thereby, to prevent tyranny.'
Senator Clinton's opinion probably failed to prevail not because of the contrary opinion of Senator Platt, but because of the
powerful opinion below by Kent. The result was typical. Despite
his usual position in the political minority,14 Kent dominated his
brethren and indeed dominated New York law during his tenure
as chief justice and later chancellor. His battle strategy was based
on erudition; his principal tactic was the long, learned opinion,
bursting with historical reference.1 49 His opinion in Yates v.
Lansing,150 for example, contains references to more than a dozen
English authorities, including Coke, Holt, DeGrey, and Hawkins,
in accordance with his adherence to what must have been a favorite maxim, juvat accedere fontes atque haurire-returnto the
ancient fountains and drink deeply. The aesthetics of such'an
opinion were personally pleasing to Kent, but professional
concerns were also served. Opinions of this type were useful in
establishing the law as a learned and liberal vocation and in providing source materials for members of the bar less learned than
the chief justice when few materials had existed previously.' 1
The political significance of the opinion is perhaps the most
important factor. The opinion had immediate significance in the
145. Id. at 433.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 435-36.
148. Kent, a Federalist, was subject to a Democratic majority during all but three
years of his sixteen-year tenure on the supreme court. J. HORTON, supra note 137, at 139-

40.
149. Id. at 147-52. For a harsh view of this strategy, see P. MILLER, THE LEGAL
IN AMERICA

MIND

92-94 (P. Miller ed. 1962).

150. 5 Johns. at 291. Kent's interpretation of the English authorities was refuted by
Yates' counsel, 9 Johns. at 396-97, 407-12, and by Senator Clinton, id. at 432-35.
151. G. WHITE, THE ArImCm JUDICLAL TRADrION 45-46 (1976). See L. Fa=DmAN,
supra note 114, at 283, 290-91; J. HORTON, supra note 137, at 151-52; P. MILTER, TaE LIFE
OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 109-16, 134-43 (1965).
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controversy over reception of English law. This and similar opinions must have infuriated Federalist Kent's Democratic opponents, who were more interested in the originality in American
law than in drinking deeply from the ancient fountains of English
law."'2 Especially in this case, were the Democratic fears justified,
for the old law was used to insulate judges from actions that
might be necessary to preserve the people's liberties.'5 3 Kent,
however, was concerned that the liberties of the people might be
perverted into license.' 5'
Contrasting the opinions of Kent and Clinton illustrates the
larger significance of the case as an incident in the contemporary
conflict between two conceptions of law, one dying and one nascent. 55 In the eighteenth century view, the "grand basis of the
common law" was "the law of nature and its author."'' Kent's
opinion is exemplary for its conclusion that there exists a precise
rule of judicial immunity in a form essentially unchanged within
the memory of man. For the nineteenth century, however, law
was the servant of the present more than the guide from the
past. 5' Clinton's opinion is aggressively instrumental, concerned
with the rationale and effects of a rule of immunity. It is just as
aggressively democratic, probably arousing in those of Kent's ideological persuasion fears of the majoritarian masses overwhelming the judges.
This aspect of Yates v. Lansing can be overdrawn. Kent discussed policy; Clinton analyzed precedent. But in each opinion,
there is a predominant tone or attitude, *revealingan underlying
theory of law. We are left with the impression that, for Kent, the
Yates litigation was an event in the sweep of the common law, to
be considered by reference to existing and possibly eternal principles, with issues of current political import secondary except to
the extent necessary to protect judicial independence. For Clin152. See L. FlIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 94-99; J. HORTON, supra note 137, at 14046; P. Mu.LER, supra note 151, at 105.09, 121-34.
153. See J. HORTON, supra note 137, at 186-88. This argument was made in the court
of errors by Yates' counsel, 9 Johns. at 396-97, and by Senator Clinton, id. at 433.
154. J. HORTON, supra note 137, at 186-88.
155. See generally M. HoRwrrz, supra note 137, passim; W. NELSON, supra note 119,
at 165-74; Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. Rnv. 513 (1974). But see R.
BnmwELL & R. WHITEN, THE CONSTITUTON AND TH COMMON LAw (1977).
156. M. HORwriz, supra note 137, at 4 (quoting J. OTIs, A Vindication of the British
Colonies, in PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 563 (B. Bailyn ed. 1965)).
157. See id. at 16-30. See generally sources cited at note 155 supra.
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ton, the litigation was an event looking to the future, part of the
shaping of a democratic republic in which rights of the people
could be secured against oppression from judges and others.
We have departed somewhat from the central thread of our
argument, but usefully so, for Kent's opinion is seminal and it
must be understood in context. With this background, we now
analyze the structure of the law of judicial liability created by
Kent.
Kent held "members of the superior courts of general juris15 immune from
diction""
suit for any judicial act. 5 ' In Yates,
using the common law of immunity to interpret the habeas corpus
act, Kent found that Chancellor Lansing's action was not invalid
under the act, but in so finding Kent extended the notion of
superior court. The English concept of a superior court originated
in the close relationship between royal judges and the source of
their authority, the sovereign. 10 As the concept developed over a
long period of time, at least up to the time of Kent, its precise
meaning was uncertain, but it clearly applied only to a very limited number of courts.' In America, there were no such superior
courts, strictly speaking. Indeed, by Kent's time the notion that
courts derived their authority from the will of the people 6 ' contradicted the very idea of a superior court. As Senator Clinton
pointed out, the people had delegated to no court in law or equity
cognizance of all legal subjects, and therefore every court was a
court of limited jurisdiction.' 5 Kent, however, created an American analogy to the English superior court: the court of general
jurisdiction. The analogy was not absurd, but neither was it consistent with the development or policies of the Engish law nor,
more importantly, was it adequately justified in Kent's opinion." 4
158. 5 Johns. at 290.
159. Kent did not define "judicial act," but his examples suggest that the concept of
judicial act was broader than that of jurisdiction; this was also true in English law. See,

e.g., Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607).
160. See notes 69-74 and accompanying text supra.

161. See notes 57-78 and accompanying text supra.
162. W. NELSON, supra note 119, at 90.

163. 9 Johns. at 433.
164. A possible justification was offered subsequently by Justice Field in Randall v.
Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868), that American superior judges are answerable only
to the people through removal from office, just as English superior judges are answerable
only to the King. Id. at 537. Interestingly, this argument is one that would have had more
validity in Kent's time, when frequent removal of judges was a contemporary issue, than
in 1869, when the pattern of removal only in the most extreme cases had been set. See L.
FRiEDMAN,

supra note 114, at 113-16. We may speculate that if the thought had occurred
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The absolute immunity of the few highest judicial officers in England, established because of their close ties to the crown, was
transferred by this method to a large number of judges in Amer5

ica.16
The influence of Kent's statement and application of the rule
were widespread. Until Justice Field's opinion in Bradley, Yates
was the leading American authority. This branch of Kent's rule,
immunity for judges of general jurisdiction for their judicial acts,
was uniformly accepted. In fact, acceptance of immunity was so
great that it is difficult to demonstrate because of the small number. of cases. Suits against high judges such as Chancellor Yates
were barred either under Kent's rule or under Field's later revision of that rule. As in England, however, judicial liability still
remained a check on judicial wrongdoing and was directed
against those who handled the bulk of the judicial business, the
lower judges.
2. Inferior Courts. - The second half of Kent's rule concerns judges of courts of "special and limited jurisdiction."' 66 In
America, as in England, such judges were subject to a much
narrower rule of immunity and were exposed to suit more frequently than were higher judges; the latter circumstance was
both cause and result of the former.
The initial rule applied to judges of limited jurisdiction was

immunity from suit for any judicial act within their jurisdiction.
Phelps v. Sill, 17 one of the earliest American judicial liability
cases, is illustrative. In Phelps, plaintiff alleged that a probate
judge had appointed a notorious bankrupt as plaintiff's guardian
during plaintiff's minority and had not required adequate security of the guardian. The Supreme Court of Connecticut in a brief
to Kent, he would have been reluctant to advance it, for his own political situation was
sufficiently precarious that his opponents might have seized the suggestion and attempted
to remove him from office.
165. The extent to which the types of judges protected by this rule expanded from
the English practice is demonstrable by example. Among the cases establishing the English doctrine were Terry v. Huntington, 145 Eng. Rep. 557 (Exch. 1668) (judges of the
"King's courts at Westminister"), and Taaffe v. Downes, 13 Eng. Rep. 15 (C.P. Ireland
1815) (Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in Ireland). In later New York cases,
those covered by the immunity included the recorder of the city of Albany, Ayers v.
Russell, 57 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 282 (App. Div. 1888), and a United States district judge, Lange
v. Benedict, 73 N.Y. 12 (1878) (noting that although a United States judge necessarily
has limited jurisdiction, he is not thereby an "inferior" judge).
166. 5 Johns. at 290.
167. 1 Day 315 (Conn. 1804).
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opinion reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, affirming the
"settled principle" that a judge would not be liable for error of
judgment in the exercise of his power as a judge. Without citation
to authority, the court stated that this immunity was necessary
to protect judicial independence in making decisions on uncertain
points of law. " '
The basic rule for inferior judges was thus the same as for
superior judges: immunity for good faith acts within their jurisdiction. At this point, the consistency in treatment ended. If the
motivation for a broad rule of immunity was the concern for
judicial independence expressed in Phelps and many other cases,
other aspects of the immunity accorded inferior judges should
have been the same as that given superior judges. Instead, some
jurisdictions deviated in their treatment of immunity for inferior
judges, first regarding extrajurisdictional acts and then regarding
malicious acts.
(a) Extrajurisdictionalacts. - In Yates v. Lansing, Kent
stated: "Where courts of special and limited jurisdiction exceed
their powers, the whole proceeding is coram non judice, and all
concerned in such void proceedings are held to be liable in trespass."'' 9 Kent did not have to elaborate on this proposition because Yates concerned a judge of general jurisdiction, but this
statement reflects both the majority view of American courts
prior to Bradley v. Fisher, that limited jurisdiction judges were
liable for wrongful acts outside their jurisdiction, and the style of
reasoning supportive of that view, a formal style based on a rigid
concept of jurisdiction.
Kentucky law provides a good illustration of this approach
because there were a relatively large number of judicial liability
cases in Kentucky and because a more extensive account of the
contemporary Kentucky judicial system exists than is available
for most other states.17 The earliest Kentucky decision, Gregory
v. Brown,' established the basic rule that a justice of the peace
was immune from liability for erroneous acts committed by him
72
within his jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, in Ely v. Thompson, 1
the court established the inverse proposition, that an act outside
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 329.
5 Johns. at 290.
See R. IRELAND, supra note 119. See notes 213.18 and accompanying text infra.
7 Ky. (4 Bibb.) 28 (1815).
10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 70 (1820).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

31

232

SouthSOUTH
CarolinaCAROLINA
Law Review,
Vol. 31,
Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 4 [Vol.
REVIEW
LAW

31

the justice's jurisdiction would expose him to liability. In Ely, the
justice apparently did not realize that he was acting under an
unconstitutional statute, but he was liable for the excess of jurisdiction because he was held to have constructive knowledge of the
unconstitutionality. In the leading Kentucky case, Revill v.
Pettit,'Ithe supreme court reaffirmed these principles in upholding a jury instruction that a justice of the peace would be liable
for exceeding his statutory jurisdiction despite having acted in
good faith. An act in excess of jurisdiction was not a judicial act;
the act therefore was void and incapable of supporting a defense
based on judicial status. While the justice's motivation might be
relevant to the determination of the extent of damages, it was
irrelevant to the issue of liability. The notion of jurisdiction as the
basis for immunity is objective and formal: a malicious act within
the jurisdictional limits is not actionable, but a good faith act
beyond those limits is actionable. 7 ' Typically, the objectivism
and formality were explicit and unapologetic." 5
Courts in other states also stated a rule of liability for erroneous or wrongful acts outside the jurisdiction of a judge of limited jurisdiction. Sometimes, courts stated the rule in the course
176
of a decision affirming a judgment against a defendant justice,
and sometimes, in dicta in reversing such a judgment when it was
found the defendant acted within his jurisdiction.1 7 Usually, the
style of decision was the same as used by the Kentucky court, a
formal style relying heavily on precedent and on a mechanical
7
concept of jurisdiction.
The minority approach to extrajurisdictional acts of lower
court judges embodied a rule of immunity. The broadest rule of
immunity was granted in South Carolina, beginning with Reid v.
Hood,'71 which concerned an action in trespass against a justice
173. 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 314 (1860). In Revill, a justice of the peace was sued for assault
and false imprisonment for examining and committing a felony defendant without bringing him before a second magistrate as required by statute.
174. Id. at 318-19.
175. See also Scott v. West, 64 Ky. (1 Bush.) 23 (1866).
176. E.g., Sasnatt v. Weathers, 21 Ala. 674 (1852).
177. E.g., Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala. 728 (1858); Deal v. Harris, 8 Md. 40 (1855);
Burnham v. Stevens, 33 N.H. 247 (1856); Little v. Moore, 4 N.J.L. 82 (1818). See also

Cunningham v. Dilliard, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 350 (1839).
178. E.g., Burnham v. Stevens, 33 N.H. 247 (1856) (citing Yates and stating that a
lack of jurisdiction is "fatal" to a defense of judicial immunity).
179. 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 168 (1819). An earlier case included dictum that "no
suit will lie against a judge for any opinion delivered by him in his official capacity."
Brodie v. Rutledge, 1 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 70 (1796).
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of the peace for issuing an attachment against property in a matter outside his jurisdiction. In affirming a verdict for the defendant, the constitutional court stated that to prevent vexatious
litigation and to protect judicial independence, a justice who
made an erroneous decision would be immune from suit even
though the matter was outside his jurisdiction. ' Noting the distinction between judicial and ministerial officers, Justice Richardson argued that because the function of a judicial officer is
to give judgment, he must be protected when he does so. 8 ' The
Reid opinion, aggressively and completely policy-oriented, is as
fine an exemplar of an instrumental approach as Kent's opinion
in Yates v. Lansing' and Justice Duvall's opinion in Revill v.
Pettit'1 are of a formalistic one. Except for a passing reference to
the lack of prior cases establishing judicial liability and a general
reference to Blackstone, "I the opinion is completely devoid of
precedential authority, relying instead on a discussion of the
practical necessity for a rule of immunity. The contrast to the
Kentucky approach is apparent, with the Kentucky courts finding liability when formal jurisdictional limits are exceeded and
the South Carolina courts extending immunity beyond those lim-

its when the judge in fact, though not in law, acts judicially.'"
The Reid doctrine was applied in later cases to immunize a magistrate who after deliberation had violated an "obvious duty" to
bail a party instead of committing him to jail' 6 and a magistrate
180. 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) at 172.
181. Id. at 169-70 ("In all judicial questions, then, the very aim and duty of the officer
is to give his true opinion after due enquiry; if erroneous, he can no more answer for the
error than for the head which heaven has given him.').
182. See notes 149-52 and accompanying text supra.
183. See notes 173-75 and accompanying text supra.
184. 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) at 170, 172.
185. Although we discuss later the effect of Bradley on the state courts, its effect on
the approach of the South Carolina courts is particularly interesting. In McCall v. Cohen,
16 S.C. 445 (1881), the traditionally broad South Carolina rule of immunity was merged
with Justice Field's analysis. In McCall, the court held a trial justice immune from suit
despite his rendering a void judgment since he had subject-matter jurisdiction; this situation was analogous to excess of jurisdiction in the Bradley distinction between excess and
absence of jurisdiction. Reid was a similar case in the court's view. Id. at 449-50. The court
adopted Justice Field's style of reasoning and substantive analysis, abandoning the policyoriented jurisprudence of Reid for the formalism of Bradley.
186. Young v. Herbert, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 172 (1819). As in Reid, the court
noted that in some circumstances the failure to discharge such a simple duty would raise
an implication of malice and remove the immunity, but when the magistrate deliberated
prior to making his decision, no malice was present. Id. at 173.
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who had issued a warrant without jurisdiction. 8 7
No other state provided as much immunity for judges of
limited jurisdiction as did South Carolina, but some states did
moderate the severity of the majority rule of liability for extrajurisdictional acts, usually by distinguishing the extent to which
jurisdiction had been exceeded. In Indiana, for example, in State
ex rel. Conley v. Flinn,'8' the court distinguished what it called
"act[ing] illegally and erroneously"'' from acting without jurisdiction and found that sureties on the official bond of a justice of
the peace were not liable when the justice issued improper process. Subsequently, in Dietrichs v. Schaw, "I the court held liable
a justice of the peace who issued an arrest warrant without even
general subject-matter jurisdiction, distinguishing that mistake
from a mere mistake in judgment. Similarly, an Illinois court, in
Lancaster v. Lane,"' distinguished between want of jurisdiction
and abuse of jurisdiction, and held that a justice of the peace who
had jurisdiction over a case was not liable for erroneously fining
parties for engaging in an altercation in the course of proceedings.
(b) Malicious acts. - For malicious acts within the jurisdiction of a lower court judge, the courts again developed competing rules of liability and immunity, but here the competing positions attracted approximately equal numbers of adherents.
Courts employed the same mode of analysis as was used to examine liability for extrajurisdictional acts, but often with different
consequences."'
The South Carolina courts established an immunity for extrajurisdictional acts on policy grounds, but the same analysis
applied to malicious acts produced a rule of liability. The former
rule was based on the desire to protect the justice's exercise of
independent, though erroneous, judgment;'93 when there was no
such exercise of judgment because the justice was motivated by
factors properly extraneous, there was no need for protection, the
difference being between a "head mistaken" and a "heart de187. Miller v. Grice, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 147 (1844).
188. 3 Blackf. 72 (Ind. 1832).
189. Id. at 74.

190. 43 Ind. 175 (1873).
191. 19 Ill. 242 (1857).
192. Again, in some cases the state's "rule" must be drawn from dicta. See notes
176-77 and accompanying text supra.
193. See note 181 and accompanying text supra.
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of the difficulty of proving subjective malice,

a doctrine of a constructive malice was developed; proof that the
action was grossly outside the norm permitted an inference of
malice." 5
Courts in other states that developed a rule of liability for
malicious acts did so on less overtly policy-oriented grounds. In
Howe v. Mason,"'9 the Iowa Supreme Court used precedent to a
large extent, and policy to a lesser extent, in restricting immunity
to judges who acted in good faith. The Tennessee court arrived
at the result indirectly, starting from the position that a judge is
immune from suit for honest errors of judgment'97 and subsequently filling out the rule by stating that only malice, either
expressed or implied by conduct, would provide the basis for
suit. 98
Those states that immunized lower court judges for their
malicious acts did so in a style that became characteristic of
immunity cases. 9 For example, two 1843 Missouri cases established an absolute rule of immunity for acts within the jurisdiction, even for malicious acts of justices of the peace. In Stone v.
Graves,10 an action in case brought against a justice for corrupt
refusal to enter a judgment and for neglect of office by which a
promissory note was lost or destroyed, the court relied on Yates
v. Lansing and English authorities expressing the policies favoring judicial independence and discouraging vexatious litigation
and held lower judges immune for all judicial acts within their
jurisdiction, even when malice was alleged.2"' In Lenox v.
Grant,'°" an action against a justice for malicious issuance of a
warrant, the court reaffirmed its position and explained that a
judge acting in a ministerial capacity could be liable for misfeasance even though the same judge acting in a judicial capacity
would not be liable even for malfeasance. For a ministerial act,
the act itself was the cause of oppression and therefore would be
194. Reid v. Hood, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 168, 170 (1819). Accord, Young v.
Herbert, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 172 (1819).
195. See Young v. Herbert, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) at 173.
196. 14 Iowa 510 (1863).
197. Hoggatt v. Bigley, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 236, 238 (1845).
198. Cope v. Ramsey, 49 Tenn. (2 Heisk.) 197 (1870); Boyd v. Ferris, 29 Tenn. (10
Hum.) 406 (1849).
199. See notes 239-42 and accompanying text infra.
200. 8 Mo. 148 (1843).
201. Id. at 150.
202. 8 Mo. 254 (1843).
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actionable, but, for a judicial act, "it is the erroneous judgment
that produces or causes the oppression."2"3 Since a determination
of malice or good faith behind the judgment could only be made
by "the great searcher of hearts" '04 and not by a jury, it would be
impossible to impose liability in the absence of confession. The
court did recognize, however, that malfeasance could be the basis
for public sanction such as indictment despite the same proof
problems.
While other examples of immunity for malicious acts could
be given," 5 the point relevant to our analysis is the method by
which the decisions were reached. The basic authorities were traditional ones, English and American, sometimes misinterpreted
by state courts to apply to justices of the peace. In their decisions,
courts typically argued the policies favoring judicial immunity,
such as protection of judicial independence and prevention of
vexatious litigation. The use of policy arguments, however, was
almost superficial; the opinions in these cases were decidely formal, even formulaic, but not policy-oriented. The opinion writers
followed a pattern that made use of both precedent and policy,
but the repeated application of the pattern makes it difficult to
regard policy as the primary motivation for the result. The pattern began with a statement of the rule of immunity for acts
within the justice's jurisdiction. That immunity was then justified on policy grounds and extended to any act within the jurisdiction, even if malicious. Finally, the extension would be supported on similar policy grounds. The key concept throughout
was the formal notion of jurisdiction; any acts outside the boundary are actionable, any acts inside the boundary are not. The
courts did not seriously weigh the policy issues. Had the courts
done so, they would have been forced to deal with the anomaly
of holding one judge liable for acting in the honest belief that he
had jurisdiction, while holding another immune though he deliberately abused his office.
3. Interpretation.- Our examination of the law of judicial
immunity prior to Bradley demonstrates that it is incorrect to
assume that judicial immunity from civil suit is a uniform princi203. Id. at 255.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Bailey v. Wiggins, 6 Del. (1 Houst.) 299, 305 (1856); Stewart v.
Cooley, 23 Minn. 347, 350-51 (1877); Taylor v. Doremus, 16 N.J.L. 473, 474 (1838); Furr
v. Moss, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 525, 527 (1860).
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ple, long established at common law. Immunity was the rule for
some judges some of the time, but just as in England, American
courts also held many, if not most, judicial officers liable for their
wrongful acts much, if not most, of the time. This conclusion
significantly weakens a principal support for judicial immunity
decisions from Bradley to Stump, the support afforded by historical precedent. Our review of the history, however, is intended not
only to refute a spurious rationale for judicial immunity, but also
to provide insight into the development of the law in a way that
will illuminate the meaning of current developments and the entire issue of judicial liability. To accomplish this, we will concentrate on the way judges perceive the situations that result in
judicial liability cases," 8 how the judges respond, and what that
response reveals about the judges' beliefs." 7 This method is responsive to a number of currents in contemporary social and legal
theory"'5 which we hope to modestly advance by illustration.
The judicial response to civil actions against other judges was
shaped by two sets of variables. The first set includes the trial
judge's perception of the many facets of the judicial liability
problem: the type of judge involved as defendant, the interests
of the plaintiff and, more broadly, the public, and the demands
of the judicial system and legal profession. The second set of
variables includes the judge's perception of his own role as a
judge, particularly an appellate judge, in a democratic society.
The most distinctive feature of the law of judicial liability in
this period is that it was created by state courts of last resort, but
it affected principally those on the lower rungs of the judicial
ladder - the magistracy. Judicial liability cases usually concerned justices of the peace, county judges, probate judges, and
206. We state that the situations exist prior to their presentation as legal issues to
emphasize that there is a reality prior to the labelling of incidents as part of the judicial
liability problem by appellate courts. The interactions between parties and judges also
affect the law; one of our suggestions is that there is a general perception of such situations
as usually not giving rise to a cause of action, which becomes legally significant when
expressed by courts. See Gabel, Intention and Structure in ContractualConditions: Outline of a Method for CriticalLegal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977).
207. Roberto Unger labels this correspondence between belief and conduct
"meaning". R. UNGER, LAw IN MODERN SocIETY 245-48 (1976).
208. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); R. UNGER, supra note
207; Gabel, supranote 206; Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication,
89 H v. L. Ray. 1667 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Form and Substance]; Kennedy, Legal
Formality, 2 J. LEG. STuD. 351 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Legal Formality].
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the like. 0 9 The high position of the magistrate in the colonies has
been previously mentioned," ' but that position did not continue
for long after the Revolution. The sources of the decline in the
status of lower judicial offices and in the quality of incumbents
included the collapse of accepted social values, the emergence of
a new democratic spirit, and the growth of government in society;" ' the effects of this decline are clear. While an earlier justice of the peace could usually eschew formal enforcement mechanisms because of the informal resources he could command from
his status as a member of a local gentry, a nineteenth century
justice was more likely to be principally a legal official rather
than a social leader; the nature of his office was transformed
accordngly."1 '
Robert Ireland has described the situation in Kentucky, a
state that developed a considerable body of law on judicial liability."t ' The number of justices grew throughout the period until,
prior to the constitutional change of 1848, there were 1,550 such
officers in the state,1' 4 while the population was approximately
980,000.151 Necessarily, many of the justices were ill-trained; in
1850, 80 percent were farmers and only 5.6 percent were lawyers. 16 Frequently the justices were ill-suited for their jobs. Complaints of inattendance, drunkenness, and failure to maintain
order in the courtroom were common.1 7 These problems would
have been barely tolerable if the justices were peripheral officers,
but the situation was exacerbated by their crucial role in administering the important and controversial functions of probating
wills, overseeing estate administration, protecting orphans, and
appointing guardians. Despite frequent intervention by courts of
equity, the situation was at best confused, and complaints about
209. This pattern is similar to the structure of judicial administration in most states,
with a few judges exercising appellate and, at least in the early years, general trial jurisdiction, and the lower judges exercising petty and specialized jurisdiction. L. FRIED AN, supra
note 114, at 123-25.
210. See notes 124-25 and accompanying text supra.
211. Nelson, supra note 121, at 206-07.
212. Id. at 191-99, 206-12.
213. R. IRELAND, supra note 119. The literature on the lower courts in this period is
quite limited and Ireland's treatment is the most informative.
214. Id. at 8.
215. Kentucky's population in 1850 was 982,000. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, HIsToRIcAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMS TO 1970 at 28

(1976).
216.
217.

R. IRELAND, supra note 119, at 14. See id. at 150-53.
Id. at 80, 146-49.
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the performance of the justices were numerous. 2 1
Thus, the first thread in understanding the appellate judge's
approach to judicial liability is to recognize his perception of the
defendant. The legal distinction between superior and inferior
judges 21 would have made considerable sense to a man like Kent;
the distinction was based as much on perceived reality220 as on
jurisdictional limits. The idea that lower judges were more in
need of control from above and should therefore have a more
limited immunity from suit would have been intuitively appealing. The transfer of the English distinction, which, after all, was
222
based on similar grounds, 22' was consequently facilitated.
The appellate judge's perception of the plaintiff's interest in
the action was also important. The protection of the liberties of
the people was a central concern following the Revolution, and
chief among the liberties to be protected was security against
2
arbitrary action or wrongful injury by government officials. 2'
This concern was expressed in many ways, including a willingness
to impose liability on judicial officers when they exceeded their
authority. Judges were servants of the people, no longer agents of
a foreign power, but their service was circumscribed by the limits
of the power popularly entrusted to them. 224 The execution of this
position, however, was limited because of its interaction in the
218. Id. at 18-23.
219. See notes 166-68 and accompanying text supra.
220. See note 206 and accompanying text supra. The phrasing of the text suggests
a preexisting reality which is perceived by the judge, but that suggestion is inaccurate.
The point to be emphasized is that the distinction between superior and inferior judges is
not one arrived at by the appellate judge after reflection, but rather a part of the legal
phenomena of the time, which the judge then expresses through the law of judicial liability. The difference is one between instrumentalism and phenomenology. Unfortunately,
no clear explication of legal phenomenology exists. Gabel, supra note 206, is the most
comprehensive attempt to provide one, but his idiom is very difficult.
221. See notes 92-102 and accompanying text supra.
222. Although we have not done sufficiently comprehensive research to fully support
the proposition, we may speculate that one reason for the development of a unique approach to judicial liability in South Carolina, see notes 179-87, 193-95 and accompanying
text supra, is the composition of the lower courts in that state. Apparently, after a brief
interlude with untrained magistrates, South Carolina returned to the pre-Revolutionary
tradition of an elite, qualified magistracy, and therefore the perception of lower judges
stated in the text may not have existed. See R. BROWN, THE SOUTH CAROLINA REGULATORS
13-14, 22-29 (1963); D. WALLAc., SOUTH CAROLINA: A SHORT HisToRy, 1520-1948, at 412
(1966). Following the Revolution, South Carolina's legal culture was generally sophisticated and progressive. See F. AUMARN, Tan CHANGING AmFucAN LEGAL SYsTEM 121-23
(DaCapo ed. 1969).
223. M. HoRwrrz, supra note 137, at 14-16; W. NELSON, supra note 119, at 89-101.
224. M. HORwrrz, supra note 137, at 14-16.
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judicial consciousness with the other elements of the problem.
The threat to the people's liberties was perceived to be from lower
officers who were the most common point of public contact with
the judicial system and the most likely to infringe popular liberties due to inadequate training and ability; 25 the judges making
the law saw no need to secure the people's rights against themselves.
Yet another element of the first set of variables was a concern
for systemic and professional values, specifically in the context of
the judicial liability problem. The policy arguments in support of
judicial immunity made most frequently throughout this period,
as later,228 included the fear of vexatious litigation, the degradation of the judiciary in the eyes of the public, and the loss of
judicial independence. These fears were real, and at the time, not
unjustifiable. Given the extent of public antipathy for the bar and
the judiciary following the Revolution 27 and the variety of reform
proposals, 2 we can understand how the judges could see themselves as besieged and how therefore they naturally would be
concerned with maintaining and increasing the integrity of the
process from which they derived their power and position. The
picture of a high judge as a defendant before the bench, not
presiding on it, could not have been pleasant, especially because
the prospect was not unrealistic given the many contemporary
controversies involving judges. 229 Accordingly, the expressions of

concern in the opinions20 are understandable, and the conclusion,
forestalling such unseemly occurrences by immunizing judges,
while not predictable, was at least highly probable.
As before, the distinction in treatment generally observed
between judges high and low may be understood by the interaction of the systemic concerns with the appellate judges' perceptions of the differences between the types of judicial officers. Although justices of the peace were most likely to be influenced by
the threat of litigation and most likely to be less independent if
225. See notes 210-18 and accompanying text supra.
226. See note 363 and accompanying text infra.
227. L. FRMN, supra note 114, at 265-66; C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AIhiCAN
BAR 212-24 (1911); Gawalt, Sources of Anti-Lawyer Sentiment in Massachusetts, 17401840, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1970); Nash, The PhiladelphiaBench and Bar,1800-1861,
in 7 ComP. STUD. m Soc'y & HIsT. 203, 209-14 (1965).
228. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 277; Nash, supra note 221.
229. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 111-16.
230. E.g., Phelps v. Sill, 1 Day 315, 329 (Conn. 1804).
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more exposed to liability, the degradation of such officers would
not be as disastrous because of their more mundane position.
Additionally, the image of a justice of the peace as defendant
would be less distasteful than that of a superior court judge in the
same position because justices were of a class of government officials who usually had been answerable to suit for their errors.3 1
Because they were judges, justices were entitled to protection
when they acted in their judicial capacity, but when they overstepped their bounds, the necessity of restraining them in favor
of the popular rights outweighed any loss in judicial stature.
Professional values were related to systemic values on this
point. The struggle in this period sought not only to establish the
12
position of the bench, but to raise the position of the bar as well.
Here the prevention of judicial degradation was linked to the
advancement of the legal profession, since the judges were ostensibly the leaders of the legal profession. Moreover, as the uniqueness, the professionalism, and, indeed, the mystery of the legal
process were increasingly emphasized, the exposure of agents of
the process, and thereby the process itself, to scrutiny in civil
actions became less desirable, given the goal of elevating the
position of the bar. Again, such professional concerns were less
weighty in the case of lower judges, because lower judges were
generally not professionals.m Concomitantly, they deserved less
consideration on these grounds to emphasize the differences between legal professionals and others who happened to exercise
legal functions.
The second set of influences on the judges' decisions in judicial liability cases included more general concerns with the judicial role in the democratic process. The first of these influences
was the use of the English law of judicial liability. Despite widespread antipathy for English law in the new nation,234 early American courts made extensive use of the English principles and precedents. The impression conveyed is different for two groups of
judges, consonant with their different positions in the controversy
over the reception of English law.25 Most judges believed that the
arguments in support of the rules developed were advanced sig231. See notes 121-22 and accompanying text supra.
232. See P. MuLER, supra note 151, at 99-116.
233. See note 216 and accompanying text supra.
234. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 94.
235. Id.; P. MmLER, supra note 151, at 121-34.
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nificantly by the fact that they paralleled English rules,2 36 but for
some judges the process was modified, with opinions and analyses
beginning with the English law as real authority, not only as
additional support. 27 For both groups, the English law was reinterpreted in important ways,28 but its structure was preserved as
the basis of American law.
The second general influence is the judicial style deemed
appropriate for this body of law. 23 As our comments on the influence of English law would suggest, some courts utilized a formal
style of reasoning, resolving issues by the application of existing
authority. 20 A few courts, however, approached issues as policy
matters, adopting a result-oriented style that made diminished
use of precedent. 241 Gradually, the dominant style for courts favoring immunity became what we have labelled not so much
formal as formulaic, mixing precedent and policy without real
deliberation, but using instead an established path to a predictable result.2 2 This style permitted courts to ignore the doctrinal
inconsistencies they created. It also reflects what is sometimes
forgotten in the judicial styles debate, that all common-law systems are formal to some extent, so that questions of judicial style
are most important at the periphery of the law and many common issues are easily resolved and thus do not require extensive
inquiry, either formal or instrumental.
To conclude the discussion of the factors shaping judges'
decisions in this area, we suggest a few of the ways in which these
236. E.g., Deal v. Harris, 8 Md. 40 (1855); Little v. Moore, 4 N.J.L. 84 (1818).
237. Kent is the best example. See Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1810).
238. See notes 158-65 and accompanying text supra.
239. The debate over styles of judicial reasoning and the approaches to law ex-

pressed therein has increased of late. See R. BRIDWELL & R. WHrrrN, supra note 155; M.
Honwrrz, supra note 137, passim; W. NELSON, supra note 119, at 165-74; Form and Sub-

stance, supra note 208; Legal Formality, supra note 208; Nelson, supra note 155; Paine,
Instrumentalismvs. Formalism:Dissolving the Dichotomy, 1978 Wisc. L. REv. 997; Scheiher, Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration of American "Styles of
Judicial Reasoning" in the 19th Century, 1975 Wisc. L. Rxv. 1. Most of the debate has

been directed at private law adjudication, necessitating some extrapolation to deal with
what is basically a public-law issue.
240. E.g., Holcomb v. Cornish, 8 Conn. 374 (1831); Deal v. Harris, 8 Md. 40 (1855);

Gordon v. Farrar, 2 Doug. 411 (Mich. 1847); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1810).
241.

South Carolina is the best example. See notes 179-87 and accompanying text

supra.
242. See note 205 and accompanying text supra.
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influences changed over time, thus altering judges' perception of
the issue, and the relationship of those changes to changes in the
law. 243 First, as state judicial systems became further articulated
and further professionalized during the nineteenth century, " the
perception of the lower judges as an inferior class declined. The
quality of the incumbents may not have improved greatly in the
shift from semi-rural justices of the peace to urban lower trial
judges,4 5 but the perception of the officers arguably did. The later
officeholders were seen more as true judges, despite the lack of
verifiable increase in actual competence. The distinction between
superior and inferior judges became less pronounced and their
common status as judicial officers was more important than any
differences in jurisdiction or ability. Second, the interest in pro'tecting the rights of the people faded to some extent after the
revolutionary ardor cooled. This is not to say it became a trivial
issue, but it did become an issue of less general concern as the
public attention and especially judicial attention were diverted to
other matters. For example, the Supreme Court that decided
Bradley v. Fisher was on the verge of an era when the rights of
the propertied classes in an orderly society were seen to be the
rights most worthy of protection, in preference to the claims of a
majoritarian movement.241 Third, the necessities of judicial administration became increasingly important as the judicial system became larger and more complex.247 The threat of disruption
from private suits against judges was a significant danger at a
time when the system was barely able to function even without
such interference. The demands of professionalism also increased
as the extent of professionalization grew, and thus both systemic
and professional demands made judicial liability less appealing.
C.

Bradley v. Fisher

The leading judicial liability case prior to Stump was the
243. Some of these changes, especially the first and the third, continued past the
time of Bradley.
244. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 336-39. See, e.g., Surrency, The Evolution of
an Urban JudicialSystem: The PhiladelphiaStory, 18 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 (1974).
245. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 325-26; J. HuRsT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
LAW: THE LAw MAKERS 138-46 (1950). Of course, urban justices also were present in the
earlier group and rural judges in the latter.
246. See notes 277-80 and accompanying text infra. See generally A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CmSIS AND THE RuLE OF LAW (1960).
247. See sources cited notes 244-45 supra.
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United States Supreme Court's 1872 decision in Bradley v.
Fisher.24 Justice Field's opinion in Bradley recreating the law of
judicial liability received widespread acceptance in state courts
and was instrumental in creating the broad rule of immunity
applied in Stump. ' Thus, the decision in Bradley and its context
deserve careful examination.
Three years before the decision in Bradley, Field delivered
the opinion of the Court in Randall v. Brigham.25 In Randall,the
plaintiff, formerly an attorney, brought suit in federal court
against a justice of the Superior Court of Massachusetts, a court
of general jurisdiction, for wrongfully removing him from the bar
without complying with proper procedures. The circuit court directed a verdict for the defendant and the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground of judicial immunity.
After stating the facts of the case, Field announced his doctrine of immunity:
Now, it is a general principle, applicable to all judicial officers,
that they are not liable to a civil action for any judicial act done
within their jurisdiction. In reference to judges of limited and
inferior authority, it has been held that they are protected only
when they act within their jurisdiction. If this be the case with
respect to them, no such limitation exists with respect to judges
of superior or general authority. They are not liable to civil
actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess
of their jurisdiction, unless perhaps where the acts, in excess of
jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly.71
Field supported this doctrine by discussing cases from Floyd v.
Barker and Taaffe v. Downes through Yates v. Lansing.2 2 In his
discussion, he attempted the first justification of Kent's application of the concept of an English superior court to American
courts of general jurisdiction.23 Observing that in England superior judges are the King's delegates and should therefore be
obliged to answer for their actions only to the King, Field con248. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
249. Justice Davis' brief dissent, id. at 357, joined by Justice Clifford, had no impact
on the later law.
250. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
251. Id. at 535. Field stated categorically that the removal of an attorney always is
a judicial act. In Randall, the order certainly was a judicial act because it was made in
the course of normal proceedings in which the plaintiff appeared.
252. See id. at 536-39.
253. See notes 158-65 and accompanying text supra.
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cluded that since judicial officers in the United States are the
delegates of the people, they should be answerable only to the
people through removal from office and not to private parties in
civil actions.24
In Bradley, Justice Field modified his doctrinal statement by
blurring the distinction between superior and inferior courts and
by removing the qualification of liability for malicious acts. Bradley, a member of the District of Columbia bar, was defense attorney, and Fisher, a justice of the District of Columbia Supreme
Court sitting in criminal court, was presiding judge at the trial
of John H. Suratt for the murder of Abraham Lincoln. Following
the discharge of the jury for failure to reach a verdict, Fisher
directed that Bradley's name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of the criminal court for threatening Fisher and accosting
him "in a rude and insulting manner" during the course of the
trial. In a prior related action, the Supreme Court had overturned
the disbarment on jurisdictional grounds,255 and in Bradley v.
Fisher,Bradley sought damages from Fisher for the disbarment.
The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for defendant Fisher,
holding that judicial immunity was a bar to the action. 25
Field's basic statement of the doctrine spoke only of judges
of general jurisdiction: "judges of courts of superior or general
jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts,
even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are
alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. ' ' 257 Thus,
immunity of judges of general jurisdiction was limited by Field's
distinction between excess of jurisdiction, an act outside jurisdiction but concerning a matter over which the judge or court has
subject-matter jurisdiction, and absence ofjurisdiction, an act for
which "there is clearly no jurisdiction of the subject matter"; 25 8 a
judge would be immune for the former but not for the latter.21
The two examples he gave were a judge of a court of "general
criminal jurisdiction" holding trial in a particular offense not
254.
255.

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 537. Cf. note 164 supra.
Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364 (1869).

256.

Field also stated that Bradley could not establish a valid cause of action be-

cause he could not admit into evidence the order of removal that earlier was held void. 80

U.S. (13 Wall.) at 345-46. Most of the opinion, however, focuses on the judicial immunity
issue.

257. Id. at 351.
258.
259.

Id. at 351-52.
Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

45

South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
31, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 4[Vol. 31
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW

made an offense by law and a probate judge trying a criminal
offense. The difficulty with these examples, however, is that both
a criminal court judge and a probate judge are judges of limited,
inferior jurisdiction, not of general, superior jurisdiction.
The effect of this confusing portion of Field's opinion was to
both limit and expand judicial immunity. The limitation arose
because the distinction between excess of jurisdiction and absence of jurisdiction solidified the notion of judicial act that always had been the boundary of the immunity of superior judges.
Bradley provided explicit authority for holding liable a superior
court judge who acts in absence of jurisdiction. The expansion of
liability arose because Field's analysis began the merger of the
doctrinal treatment of superior and inferior judges. Although
Field's language referred only to judges of superior or general
jurisdiction, later courts followed the inherent logic and applied
it to lower judges as well, thus expanding the immunity of those
judges.'
A second element of Field's rule in Bradley was the removal
of the malice qualification of the Randall test. In Bradley, superior judges were held immune without regard to their motives.
Field distinguished his contrary statement in Randall, stating it
was intended only to limit that opinion to the facts in the case
and avoid unnecessary conflict with some prior opinions."' Here
again, although Field's holding reached only superior court
judges, the facts of the case and the implications of the decision
were not similarly limited.
The third point to be made concerning Field's rule in Bradley
is his elucidation, explicit and implicit, of the nature of a judicial
act. His statement of the basic rule included the requirement that
the act be a "judicial act." In part, this is a reflection of jurisdictional notions; an act in absence of jurisdiction is not a judicial
act. Beyond that, Field suggested, a judicial act would require
adherence to certain fundamental notions of judicial process. The
first of these notions was the opportunity to be heard, including
the right to receive notice of the grounds of the complaint and the
right to present a defense. In Bradley, originally a contempt of
court proceeding, these requisites could be waived only if they
were superfluous because the contempt occurred in the presence
260.
261.

See notes 294-304 and accompanying text infra.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 350-51.
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of the judge.262 The second notion was the availability of an alternate remedy in place of personal liability of the judge, namely
appeal or other procedure in error. The observance of these procedures would immunize the judge;"8 3 in Stump, of course, their
absence did not remove the immunity.
Field justified his decision by precedent and policy. He cited
Kent in Yates 64 and Lemuel Shaw in Pratt v. Gardner, 5 as well
as a half dozen of the leading English authorities, 266 and stated
with only the usual degree of exaggeration that the rule of immunity "has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for
many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are aware of,
in the courts of this country.

'267

Most of his opinion, though,

embodied a policy discussion in favor of his rule of immunity. 26
The arguments he made were familiar ones, similar to those in
both prior and subsequent cases, but the tone is different. Here
is none of the dreary, formulaic recitation of policy we noted in
earlier state court opinions, 26 but rather a comprehensive and
persuasive presentation of the dangers of judicial liability. 27

According to Field, every judicial proceeding leaves at least
one party disappointed. In cases concerning personal liberty or
character, the disappointment is particularly keen. Such disappointment breeds complaint and, if the law allowed it, the complaint quickly would extend from the judgment to the judge and
his motives. If civil actions could be maintained on these complaints, many undesirable consequences would ensue. First, a
defendant judge could be summoned before another, perhaps inferior, judge to explain his decision; indeed, that judge could be
called to answer before a third judge, and so on. Second, the judge
would feel compelled to preserve a complete record of evidence
and authorities in every case to demonstrate the integrity of his
decisionmaking. Third, the judge would be in apprehension of the
personal consequences of every decision, undermining the judicial
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
judges.
269.
270.

Id. at 354-55.
See id. at 354.
See id. at 347.
See id. at 349 (citing Pratt v. Gardner, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 63 (1849)).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 passim.
Id. at 347.
By implication, the opinion favored the future extension of the rule to all
See notes 239-42 and accompanying text supra.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347-49.
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independence necessary for the effectiveness and respectability of,
the judicial process. Only a rule of judicial immunity could prevent this disastrous situation. Moreover, other public remedies
for judicial irresponsibility, such as impeachment, would be sufficient.
The opinion in Bradley is classically Fieldian.2 71 The scholarly commentary suggests that Field's judicial posture became
more extreme in the later portion of his tenure on the Supreme
Court," ' but we can identify a significant shift even in the three
years between Randall and Bradley. In his 1869 opinion, his language was more temperate, his reliance on precedent greater, his
concern for the consequences of liability less; he even conceded
the possibility of a malice exception. By 1872, his posture had
changed, his tone had become more extreme and less judicious.
Carl Swisher has suggested that Field had a conception of relativity: "Either a certain thing must happen or an alternative of a
particular kind, usually one very much to be dreaded, must follow." 27 That is the case with the Bradley opinion. Field's parade
of horribles dominated the opinion"' and ostensibly precluded his
engaging in a more careful analysis of the purposes and effects of
his rule, as well as its appropriate limits.2 7 5 Implicit in the opinion2 7 is the conservatism which was to be the trademark of Field's
career 2l and of the Supreme Court in this period.7 8 The foremost
judicial concern was the declaration of legal rules to preserve the
social order by preventing precipitous changes initiated by dangerous elements in society. In this context, the rule of judicial
271.

See generally C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD, CRAFrSMAN OF THE LAW (1930); G.

WHIrE, supra note 151, at 84-108; Graham, JusticeField and the FourteenthAmendment,
52 YALE L.J. 851 (1943); McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudenceof Government-

Business Relations 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975); Westin, Stephen Field and the Headnote
to O'Neill v. Vermont, 67 YAL. L.J. 363 (1958).
272. Graham, supra note 271, at 855-57.
273. C. SWISHER, supra note 271, at 202.
274. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347-49.
275. If we were to engage in crude historicism, we also might suggest that the result
Field reached was derived in part from the influence of his own confrontations with judges

while a practicing lawyer or his conception of the judge's role from his service as an
alcalde, ignorant of the relevant law but applying rough justice in early California. See

C. SWISHER, supra note 271, at 31-48, 62-64, 341-61.
276. See notes 206-08 and accompanying text supra.
277.

See C. SWISHER, supra note 271, at 430; G. WHITE, supra note 151, at 95;

Graham, supra note 271, at 851-52.
278.

See generally A. PAUL, supra note 246; G. WHrT, supra note 151, at 105-08.

279.

See A. PAUL, supra note 246, at 4-5; C. SWISHER, supra note 271, at 430.
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immunity was an additional line of defense, and an especially
important one. If the judges, the principal defenders of an orderly
society, 2 0 would have themselves been subject to attack, that
could have been the point at which the entire defense crumbled.
The rule of immunity was therefore of con-siderable importance
to the conservative judicial outlook.
Despite Field's concern with the effects of judicial immunity,28' his opinion was formal in a significant sense. Although the
concerns were for policy effects, the legal vehicle was a rule that
Field perceived to be formally realizable.28 2 The key to the rule of
immunity was the excess/absence of jurisdiction distinction. For
Field, the distinction was real on its face, without need to resort
to the purposes of immunity in applying the distinction. This
kind of analysis reached its peak in United States v. E. C. Knight
Co.,m in which it was clear to the Court that "commerce" within
the meaning of the Sherman Act could be distinguished from
"manufacturing" without regard to the purposes to be served by
the Act. 28 ' The choice of the rule form was appropriate for the
situation and for the intellectual predisposition that shaped
Field's conception of it.
D.

From Bradley to Stump

Justice Field's opinion in Bradley reshaped the law in nearly
every jurisdiction. Judges of superior courts or courts of general
jurisdiction were, as before, immune, except for acts clearly outside the court's jurisdiction-now frequently described, in Field's
terms, as acts in absence of jurisdiction-or acts that otherwise
could be characterized as nonjudicial. Some courts specifically
28 while others simply deferred to the long hisrelied on Bradley,'
tory of judicial immunity,2 6 but the results were almost universally the same.
In this period, however, as in the era prior to Bradley, the
jurisdictions split on the liability of judges of inferior courts or
courts of limited jurisdiction. Most courts at first continued the
280. See A. PAUL, supra note 246, at 4-5; C. SwisHER, supra note 271, at 430.
281. See notes 273-75 and accompanying text supra.
282. That is, the rule would be mechanical in its operation. See notes 380-81 and
accompanying text infra.
283. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
284. Id. at 18. See A. PAUL, supra note 246, at 178-82.
285. E.g., Busteed v. Parsons, 54 Ala. 393, 401-02 (1875).
286. E.g., O'Connell v. Mason, 132 F. 245, 246 (1st Cir. 1901).
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rule that the extent of immunity of lower court judges was coincident with the limits of their jurisdiction, rendering even goodfaith errors in excess of jurisdiction actionable, as Kent had
stated in Yates v. Lansing. Thomas M. Cooley's justification for
the differing treatment accorded superior and inferior judges, in
his 1879 treatise on torts,'8 7 was particularly influential. Although
Cooley supported the traditional rules, at every point he attempted to put the rules on a sound policy basis. 8' In his analysis
of the apparent inconsistency between immunizing superior but
not inferior judges for acts in excess of jurisdiction, he noted the
differences in position, learning, and ability of different kinds of
judges, especially between superior judges and justices of the
peace, and concluded that far greater safeguards were necessary
to control the latter, with the most important safeguard being a
grant of only limited jurisdiction. Thus, a justice of the peace
would best observe the spirit of the law by deciding doubtful cases
against the exercise of his jurisdiction, and his failure to do so
would justify the imposition of civil liability. A judge of general
jurisdiction, on the other hand, being empowered to act in all
matters permitted by law, would fulfill the purpose of the law
more fully by exercising his jurisdiction in questionable cases and
thus should not be exposed to liability for exercising questionable
jurisdiction.2 89
Many courts followed Cooley's position and relied on his
presentation in holding judges of limited jurisdiction immune for
erroneous acts within their jurisdiction but not for acts that exceeded their jurisdiction. Many cases simply cited Cooley and
some repeated his arguments,2 ' while others adopted his analysis
without citation. 9' For the most part, the cases merely recited the
rules and arguments from the authorities without extensive origi23
nal analysis, 9 2 although exceptions did exist. 1
287. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1879).
288. Id. at 403-10. The uniqueness of Cooley's policy orientation is evident when
compared with the formalistic approach of other writers. See, e.g., 1 E. JAGGARD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS 121-23 (1895).
289. T. COOLEY, supra note 287, at 419-20. Although Cooley did not note the analogy,
the inspiration for this principle may have been the English presumption of jurisdiction
for superior courts. See notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra.
290. E.g., McClure v. Hill, 36 Ark. 268, 272 (1880). Bradley and Yates also were cited
frequently.
291. E.g., id.; Mitchell v. Galen, 1 Alas. 339, 341 (1901); State v. Wolever, 127 Ind.
306, 26 N.E. 762 (1891).
292. E.g., Clark v. Spicer, 6 Kan. 440 (1870); Bell v. McKinney, 63 Miss. 187 (1885).
293. E.g., State v. Wolever, 127 Ind. 306, 26 N.E. 762 (1891).
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In the 1880's, some jurisdictions began to depart from the
Yates-Bradley-Cooley treatment of judges of limited jurisdiction.
One of the earliest cases to challenge that treatment was Henke
v. McCord,2 94 in which the court rhetorically questioned the logic
of immunizing superior judges who, from their position and presumed learning, ought to be less likely to make jurisdictional
errors, while holding liable a judge inferior in position and capacity. Joel Prentiss Bishop, in his Commentaries on the Non Contract Law,2"' answered the question posed by the Iowa court by
noting the severity of treatment typically accorded to justices of
the peace and arguing that
if judges properly expected to be the most learned can plead
official exemption from their blunderings in the law, a fortiori
those from whom less is to be expected and who receive less pay,
should not be compelled to respond in damages to their mistakes honestly made, after due carefulness.2 '
In this period of great reliance on treatises, 97 Bishop's statement of the law and its rationale was influential in counteracting
the effect already achieved by Cooley's contrary position. Two
cases adopted Bishop's view over Cooley's and were thereafter
cited frequently. The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Brooks v.
5 rejected Cooley's
Mangan,21
analysis on policy grounds, without
citing Cooley; the Iowa Supreme Court, answering its own question from Henke v. McCord, put itself in the forefront of what it
perceived as a trend by holding that the liability of justices of the
peace should be coextensive with that of superior judges.9
Courts in many jurisdictions soon followed these decisions in
rejecting the distinctions among judges that had been drawn earlier. Again, some of the opinions merely repeated the arguments
or rules of the principal authorities,"'0 but a significant number
included more sophisticated attempts at policy analysis. 01 Many
294.

55 Iowa 378, 7 N.W. 623 (1880).

295. J.

BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE NON CoNTRAcr LAW (1889).
296. Id. at 363-65.
297. L. FREoDMAN, supra note 114, at 541-44.
298. 86 Mich. 576, 49 N.W. 633 (1891).
299. Thompson v. Jackson, 93 Iowa 376, 61 N.W. 1004 (1895).
300. E.g., Case v. Bush, 93 Conn. 550, 106 A. 822 (1919); McDaniel v. Harrel, 81
Fla. 66, 87 So. 631 (1921).
301. E.g., Duffin v. Summerville, 9 Ala. App. 573, 63 So. 816 (1913); Calhoun v.
Little, 106 Ga. 336, 32 S.E. 86 (1898); Rush v. Buckley, 100 Me. 322, 61 A. 774 (1905);
Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654 (1882).
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of these courts also adopted Justice Field's analysis of the jurisdictional problem and, as was implicit in his decision, 32 applied
it to all judges, thereby rendering all judges immune for acts in
excess of jurisdiction but liable for acts clearly in absence of jurisdiction. 3 By the 1920's, the movement was toward equal treatment of all judicial officers, even justices of the peace. 4
The one issue over which there remained some dispute
throughout this period was liability for malicious acts. The earlier
conflict between absolute immunity and liability for malicious
acts continued, at least with inferior judges;0 5 here the unification of the law only had the effect of increasing the tendency to
immunize lower court judges even for acts motivated by malice.
The conflict remained unresolved, and as late as the 1940's courts
held that an act within a justice's jurisdiction could give rise to a
cause of action depending on the motivation,0 6 despite the rejection of that position in Bradley and other cases.
The period from Bradley to Stump was one of consolidation
of the law of judicial liability and unification of the doctrines of
different jurisdictions. The experience of the courts with this
body of law illustrates several points of historical interest about
the period from the middle of the nineteenth century through the
early twentieth century, which saw this development in the area
of judicial liability. As an initial proposition, the clear trend toward eliminating variations among jurisdictions in the law of
judicial liability is consistent with what Lawrence Friedman has
described as "the master trend of American legal history: the
3 ' Focusing on this
trend to create one legal culture out of many.""
period, we observe the eradication of jurisdictional divergence
and the consolidation of the law on this topic, as on others. This
consolidation was impelled not by accident or aesthetics, but in
significant part by a changing legal perspective. As scientific
302. See notes 257-60 and acdompanying text supra.
303. E.g., Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga. 336, 32 S.E. 86 (1889).
304. 33 C.J. Judges § 116 (1924).
305. Compare Broom v. Douglas, 175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860 (1912) (immunity); Wyatt
v. Arnot, 7 Cal. App. 221, 94 P. 86 (1907) (immunity); and Grant v. Williams, 54 Mont.
246, 169 P. 286 (1917) (immunity) with Hollon v. Lily, 100 Ky. 553, 38 S.W. 878 (1897)
(liability).
306. E.g., Jones v. Leviton, 327 Ill. App. 309, 64 N.E.2d 195 (1945).
307. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 572. Other elements of the overall trend include
the tendency "to reduce legal pluralism; to broaden the base of the formal, official system
of law; to increase the proportion of persons, relative to the whole population, who are

consumers or objects of that law." Id.
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thought and conceptualism gained hold, many legal thinkers concluded there could be only one correct rule of law in the area of
judicial liability as in any other." 8
Two vehicles of unification were the opinion in Bradley and
Bishop's treatise. The Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century was regarded as a leader among American courts, the era of
the great state courts having passed." 9 In commercial law, for
310
example, the Court fulfilled its function, under Swift v. Tyson,
proclaiming an American common law that was broadly accepted
by state courts. 311 The decision in Bradley was accepted in much
the same way, as declarative of a sound rule to be followed, perhaps with some modification, even though state courts were
under no legal compulsion to do so. Treatises lacked the same
degree of authority as Supreme Court decisions, but they were
32
clearly a force in the shaping of a new, more rational, law.
Statements of principles in treatises were helpful to judges and
lawyers in cutting through the confusing mass of case law.
Bishop's treatises, more opinionated than most, were widely respected.3 13 As the conflict between Cooley and Bishop"' makes
obvious, however, judges had to be selective in their use of treatises, and in an area such as this, with no great conflict of social
interests, the popular choice favored the one author who best
demonstrated the logical inconsistency of the other and whose
conclusion was most compatible with the judges' perception of
31 5
their situation.
E.

Summary: History as Argument

Our historical review of the law of judicial liability illuminates two aspects of the current law of judicial liability and the
validity of decisions such as Stump. The first aspect is the use of
history and its particular legal expression, precedential authority,
as a basis for decision. This summary section addresses that
issue. The second aspect, to which the remainder of the article is
308. See W. TWNIG, KARL LLwELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 11-14 (1973); G.
WHrITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 166-72 (1978).
309. L. FRiEDMAN, supra note 114, at 540.
310. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
311. G. GmmoE, THE DEATH OF CONTRAcr 96-97 (1974).
312. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 114, at 541-43.
313. Id. at 542.
314. See notes 287-99 and accompanying text supra.
315. See notes 243-47 and accompanying text supra.
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addressed, involves the judical reasoning processes employed in
immunity cases, the legal form in which the results are expressed,
and the relation of style and form to the substantive results.
The most important reason usually offered for a rule of judicial immunity is the weight of the past. In Stump, for example,
the court stated that "[t]he governing principle of law is well
established and is not questioned by the parties."3 ' The principal
authority for this proposition was the century-old precedent of
Bradley, which likewise stated that immunity "has been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and has
never been denied, that we are aware of, in the courts of this
country. ' 31 7 Analyzing law is to a considerable extent analyzing
history. Determining the law to be applied in a particular case
through the analysis of precedent is a historical process. In the
instance of judicial liability, however, our historical review demonstrates that statements such as those in Stump and Bradley are
unworthy of the overwhelming weight they are given because they
are poor history at two levels: the courts have not understood
correctly the primary sources, the prior cases, and the courts have
evaluated inadequately the circumstances out of which the earlier
cases arose." ' We demonstrate those errors by briefly reviewing
the history we have presented and comparing it with the bald
assertions in Stump and Bradley.
English law does not provide support for a broad rule of
immunity except as it has been misread and misapplied by suc-"
cessive generations of American judges. The most ancient position of the common law was general judicial liability, not judicial
immunity. At some point the technical, archaic notion of the
special status of a court of record gave rise to a limited immunity
for a few judges, making a judge of a court of record immune from
suit for acts within the protection of the record, that is, within
his jurisdiction, and for acts that the judge could not have
known to be outside his jurisdiction. Largely for political reasons,
Coke began the process that would expand the protection of
judges, although between the time of Coke and the early nineteenth century few judicial liability cases arose. During that period, however, judges of courts not of record also were given a
316. 435 U.S. at 355.
317. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347.
318. Cf. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119,
119-22.
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limited immunity for acts within their jurisdiction.
Up to the time of Bradley, English law had not significantly
modified the limits of this immunity. Jurisdiction remained the
basis of immunity and only acts within the jurisdiction, or within
the jurisdiction as it reasonably could have been determined by
the judge, were protected. A very few of the highest courts were
regarded as superior courts and presumed to have jurisdiction in
all cases for reasons that are historical and not compelling at
present. For judges of other courts, including most of the courts
in England, the rule was only limited immunity; extrajurisdictional acts and acts within jurisdiction but motivated by malice were actionable. Indeed, most judges were so vulnerable that
Parliament was required to intervene periodically to provide
some measure of protection for lower judges subjected to civil
suits.
The reception of the English law of judicial liability in the
United States was given its greatest impetus by James Kent,
although English precedents were also widely used by others.
Kent's first contribution was the transformation of the English
doctrine of superior court in attempting to apply that doctrine to
the American judicial system. An English superior court was one
of the few of the highest courts of the realm, but under Kent's pen
the doctrine was expanded to include American courts of general
jurisdiction, encompassing a far larger number of judges. In 1810,
when high state courts typically held appellate and original jurisdiction, this was not that significant, but in later times when the
number of courts of general trial jurisdiction grew greatly, it led
to the immunization of many American judges.
Kent's second contribution was to suggest the continuation
of the English rule concerning lower judges. In America, as in
England, many of these judges had only limited immunity. Because of the lack of a unitary judicial system in the United States,
no single style emerged, but lower judges were generally liable for
wrongful extrajurisdictional acts, and were occasionally liable for
malicious acts within their jurisdiction. Certainly, no broad rule
of immunity existed prior to Bradley. The distinction drawn between high and low judges was usually formal, but was probably
motivated by understandable perceptions of the judicial system
and its functions.
Bradley v. Fisher was the leading precedent on judicial liability in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Field's formulation of the jurisdictional issue was influential in continuing
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the broad immunity for superior judges, but it also created an
opening for expanded liability. His somewhat confused statements concerning the application of that formulation to judges of
limited jurisdiction eventually led to the extension of immunity
to such judges in many jurisdictions.
We contend that only in recent times has there been a general tendency to immunize judges from civil suit. For most of the
history of the common law, judges had only a very limited immunity. It cannot be argued that there has been a growing realization of the appropriateness of immunity, for most of the expansion of immunity has been accomplished without any persuasive
analysis. Judicial methodology has included various devices, such
as formal application of inapplicable rules and definitions, onesided policy analysis, and generalization from limited evidence.
What remains is an unpersuasive historical argument for a broad
rule of immunity. Nevertheless, that argument was a principal
support for the Stump decision, which we now examine in more
detail.
IV.

JUDicIA

IMMUNITY TODAY

In the United States today, judges of general jurisdiction are,
for the most part, immune from suit for their judicial acts. The
term "judicial act" is broad enough to encompass any action of
a judge except for certain behavior not normally expected of a
judge or not colorably within the judge's jurisdiction. Judges of
limited jurisdiction share this immunity, although for some of
them the immunity is more closely associated with jurisdictional
limits and in some states malice will remove their immunity even
for jurisdictionally proper acts. The authoritative contemporary
statement of the law of judicial immunity is, of course, Stump v.
Sparkman.3 1 9 We have described how the law arrived at this state
and we have expressed our belief in the limited utility of the
historical evidence for current decisionmaking. In light of this
dissatisfaction, we review the reform proposals that have been
made by others and engage in a policy analysis of the judicial
liability problem, articulating and balancing the public and private interests implicated. In this balancing, we demonstrate that
the current law in general, and Stump in particular, incorrectly
evaluate the policy concerns, but we also argue that none of the
319. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
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proposed solutions is entirely satisfactory. To justify this position, we return to the historical materials and present a modest
jurisprudential discussion of the judicial liability issue as an illustration of a greater problem. We conclude with a suggestion of our
own that we find to be not entirely convincing but satisfying
nevertheless.
A.

Stump v. Sparkman

In Stump, the Supreme Court applied what it considered to
be the well-established rule of judicial immunity to protect Judge
Stump from liability to suit.32 0 The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, used a two-pronged test, requiring that a judge perform a judicial act that is within his subject-matter jurisdiction
to be immune. Justice Stewart dissented in an opinion joined by
Justices Marshall and Powell, on the ground that Judge Stump's
granting plaintiffs mother's petition for sterilization of plaintiff
was not a judicial act."' Justice Powell also dissented separately,
emphasizing that the lack of opportunity for appellate review of
Judge Stump's order was an important factor in rendering it nonjudicial.3 2
The judicial act concept, derived from the jurisdictional limitation on immunity, has been central to judicial immunity since
the beginning of limited immunity in English law. 313 In Stump,
the Court based its discussion of the nature of a judicial act upon
recent federal court decisions, which were among the first systematic judicial examinations of the concept,3 24 in an attempt to clarify*the nature of a judicial act and the relationship between judicial act and jurisdiction25
Justice White relied principally on the definition of judicial
act articulated in McAlester v. Brown.35 The Fifth Circuit in
320. Id. at 359.
321. Id. at 364.
322. Id. at 369.
323. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra.
324. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974); McAlester v. Brown, 469
F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970).
325. Caution is necessary in projecting the current definition backward, for the
notion of a judicial act developed in contemporary federal cases is much broader than the
definition implicit in the use of the term in the nineteenth century and earlier. See notes
169-78 and accompanying text supra.
326. 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972). Interestingly, Justice White cited in a footnote,
but did not discuss, Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974). 435 U.S. at 361

n.10. In Gregory, the Ninth Circuit referred to the policies behind judicial immunity in
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McAlester stated a four-part test for determining whether an act
is judicial,3 2 but Justice White condensed the four parts into two:
The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining
whether an act by a judge is a "judicial" one relate to the nature
of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed
by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, 3i.e., whether
they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. 2
On the first point, Justice White held that entertaining and acting on petitions, including petitions concerning the affairs of minors, is a function normally performed by a judge.32 9 He rejected
Justice Stewart's contention that since Indiana judges do not
normally act on parents' petitions for approval of surgical treatment of their children or on petitions for sterilization, Judge
Stump's act was not judicial, because the function of entertaining
and deciding the petition is normally judicial even if the particular petition is atypical. On the second point, Justice White noted
that only because Stump was a judge did McFarlin (plaintiff's
mother), on the advice of counsel, bring her petition before him,
and these expectations therefore support the construction of the
act as judicial. 33 1 Justice Stewart in response argued that neither
McFarlin's misperception of Judge Stump's power nor Stump's
representation of his judicial position by approving the petition
could confer immunity.sl

The dissenting justices disagreed with the majority not only
formulating its judicial act test, 500 F.2d at 63-65, much as Justices Stewart and Powell
did in dissent in Stump, 435 U.S. at 368-70. Like the justices, the Ninth Circuit found
the possibility of appeal to be an important component of a judicial act. 500 F.2d at 64.

327. The McAlester court's factors were "(1) the precise act complained of. . . is a
normal judicial function; (2) the events involved occurred in the judge's chambers; (3) the
controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity."
469 F.2d at 1282. Justice White's restatement of this test uses the first factor and merges
the second and fourth. Application of the third factor in Stump would have been fatal to
the claim of immunity because there was no case pending before Judge Stump.
328. 435 U.S. at 362.
329. Id. One difficulty with this formulation is the expansion of immunity that
results from considering as determinative the general category in which the judge's act
falls rather than the particular action taken. On Justice White's rationale, if McFarlin
had petitioned ex parte for the mercy killing of her daughter, Judge Stump's approval
of that petition also would have been a judicial act. Id. at 365-67 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See notes 369-72 and accompanying text infra.
330. Id. at 362.
331. Id. at 367 ("A judge is not free, like a loose cannon, to inflict damage whenever
he announces that he is acting in a judicial capacity.").
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on the application of the judicial act test in Stump, but also in

the delineation of that test. Justices Stewart and Powell argued
that to determine what is a judicial act requires resort to the
policies underlying the rule of immunity. 32 The basic policy artic-

ulated in Piersonv. Ray' 3 was the protection of the judge's principled decisionmaking,33 4 but in Stump there was no principled

decisionmaking to protect, no litigants, no case or controversy, no
weighing of the merits, 33 and, as Justice Powell emphasized, no

appellate remedy to vindicate the rights of an injured party and
to render a civil action against the judge unnecessary to redress
3
a wrong done.

3

1

The second prerequisite of judicial immunity in the majority's test is jurisdiction over the subject matter of the judge's

actions. Justice White equated subject-matter jurisdiction with
anything short of clear absence of jurisdiction in Justice Field's
dichotomy between excess of jurisdiction and absence of jurisdiction. 33 1 Because of the sweeping statutory grant of jurisdiction to
Indiana circuit court judges and the lack of a specific statutory
or common-law denial of jurisdiction in such cases, 338 Justice
332. Id. at 368-70.
333. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
334. Id. at 554.
335. See 435 U.S. at 368-69.
336. Id. at 369-70. The existence of an alternative remedy was a factor behind
judicial immunity at common law. See, e.g., Gault v. Wallis, 53 Ga. 675, 677 (1875); Pratt
v. Gardner, 56 Mass. 63, 70 (1849); Evans v. Foster, 1 N.H. 374, 377-78 (1819); Cope v.
Ramsey, 49 Tenn. 197, 200 (1870). See also text accompanying notes 262-63 supra.
337. 435 U.S. at 356-60.
338. Indiana grants circuit court judges "original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
at law and in equity whatsoever." IND. CoD § 33-4-4-3 (1976). Nonetheless, at least three
reasons have been offered why Judge Stump's action was in absence of jurisdiction even
given this broad jurisdictional grant. First, one commentator has suggested that Judge
Stump, pursuant to Indiana statutes, was acting as a juvenile court judge, a judge of
limited, not general, jurisdiction and his failure to observe proper procedures divested him
of jurisdiction. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 836-42. Second, the Seventh Circuit found that
Judge Stump's jurisdiction was ousted by a statute authorizing sterilization of institutionalized persons under certain circumstances. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 174-75
(7th Cir. 1977). Third, the Seventh Circuit also found no statutory or common-law basis
for the action that would bring it within the general grant of jurisdiction of all cases "at
law and in equity." Id. The last argument applies more to situations outside this particular case and points out the fallacy of the Stump majority's jurisdictional standard. To be
within even the most general grant of jurisdiction, an action must be one with legal
precedent. The example of euthanasia is the extreme case that demonstrates the principle.
The granting of a petition for euthanasia surely would have been in absence of jurisdiction,
especially given the lack of observance of proper procedure, even though the statutory
jurisdictional grant and subject-matter jurisdiction would have been the same as in the
actual case.
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White held that Judge Stump had subject-matter jurisdiction
over McFarlin's petition. For courts of general jurisdiction, everything that is not expressly forbidden apparently is permitted.
Further, jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction are separate
ideas, and therefore once it was determined that jurisdiction in
this general class of cases has not been specifically denied to him,
Judge Stump's "failure to comply with elementary principles of
procedural due process"" 9 was as irrelevant here as it was in the
determination of whether his act was judicial.
Substantively, Justice White's opinion in Stump is illustrative of recent trends in the decisions of the Supreme Court.4
First, the extent of potential federal interference with state judicial actions was reduced by the expansion of the immunity from
section 1983 actions first granted in Pierson. The reduction is
consistent with other decisions that generally limit federal control
of state court activities, particularly through the limitation of
section 1983 and federal-court jurisdiction over state court proceedings. 4 Second, the decision advanced managerial concerns
by eliminating private actions against judges as potentially intrusive and disruptive of the judicial process. Other decisions advanced the same concerns in aid of the efficient administration
of justice, with emphasis on "efficient," with some decrease in the
protection of individual rights taken to be an acceptable cost.3'2
In process terms as well, the decision is consistent with other
developments. First, Professor Tribe's description of certain leading opinions as containing "lapses of logic, disregard or distortion
339. This characterization was given to Stump's action by the Seventh Circuit.
Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 176 (7th Cir. 1977) (cited at 435 U.S. at 359).
340. A useful sampling of the literature concerning this trend includes L. TRImN,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978); Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental

Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1978); Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A PreliminaryView,
90 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1976); Tushnet, ".

.

. And Only Wealth Will Buy You Jus-

tice"--Some Notes on the Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 177.
341. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); L. TRIE, supra note 340, at
144-56; Developments in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1135
(1977). The Court has been more solicitous of judicial than administrative independence.
Compare Imbler, supra, with Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978). See also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 99 S.Ct. 1905
(1979). But see Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979).
342. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 99 S.Ct. 2100 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See generally Chase, The
Burger Court, The Individual, and the Criminal Process:Directions and Misdirections,
52 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 518, 589-92 (1977).
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of relevant precedent, and other indications that the decisions are
impelled by considerations that never quite surface in the opin' could accurately be applied to the opinion in Stump.
ions"343
Second, the majority opinion as a whole employs a formalistic
approach with only the pretense of weighing competing values, a
style of reasoning that has become increasingly familiar in the
Court. 3 4
Neither Bradley nor other precedents controlled the decision
in Stump, yet the Court responded to the case as if the result were
so obvious that little discussion was necessary. The majority,
unlike the dissenting minority, did not feel the need to consider
how the result would effectuate the policies behind judicial immunity; ukase was substituted for analysis.
B.

Reform Proposals

Those who have proposed reform of the law of judicial liability sometimes have done so with specificity, but more often their
proposals have included only basic principles, leaving details and
application to be worked practically. In this section, we discuss
three alternative liability rules; our concern is also with the essentials of the proposals.
1. The Good-FaithApproach. - In the leading contemporary English judicial liability case, Sirros v. Moore,345 the Court

of Appeal reversed the prior English position distinguishing superior and inferior judges and established an immunity for good
faith judicial acts. Lord Denning, M.R., and Lord Justice Ormrod
stated a simple version of the test, and Lord Justice Buckley
stated a more complicated one that is more consistent with prior
law; all three justices largely rejected the earlier basis for immunity and liability in favor of a new standard.
All three opinions examined the history of judicial liability
and, of course, noted the different treatment accorded superior
347
3
judges and inferior judges. Lord Denning " and Justice Ormrod
343. L. TREE, supra note 340, at 1130.
344. See sources cited note 340 supra.
345. [19751 1 Q.B. 118 (C.A.). In Sirros, a crown court judge was defendant in a
damage action of assault and false imprisonment for allegedly wrongfully ordering the
seizure and detention of an alien under order of deportation. Although the judge's order
was invalid, he was held not to be liable to suit because his action was committed in good

faith.
346. Id. at 136.
347. Id. at 149.
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rejected the modern validity of the distinction; Justice Buckley
stated that the same liability principle should be applicable to
both, but that its application may vary in different situations
because of jurisdictional variations.348 Lord Denning's statement
was forthright:
If the reason underlying this immunity is to ensure "that they
may be free in thought and independent in judgment," it applies to every judge, whatever his rank. . ..

So long as he does

his work in the honest belief that it is within his jurisdiction,
then he is not liable to an action. He may be mistaken in fact.
He may be ignorant in law. What he does may be outside his
jurisdiction - in fact or in law - but so long as he honestly

believes it to be within his jurisdiction, he should not be liable
... . He is not to be plagued with allegations of malice or illwill or bias or anything of the kind.m'
Although this statement includes reference to jurisdiction, clearly
the motive of the judge, the attempt to honestly fulfill judicial
responsibilities, is both the reason and the standard for immunity. This standard is different from the basic immunity rule of
Stump in the attention given by the standard to the subjective
circumstances of the judge's act.
2. The Malice Approach. - An approach similar to the
good-faith fest is a rule of general immunity except for acts committed with malice. We treat this separately from the good-faith
approach because it has been one of the reforms most frequently
suggested in the literature."'
This standard would render a judge immune from liability
except for acts committed with malice. For this purpose, malice
is defined to include not only a conscious purpose to injure, but
also reckless disregard for proper action, reflecting the definition
advanced in New York Times v. Sullivan." ' The emphasis on the
bad faith of the judge is the converse of the good-faith approach,
but the two standards are essentially harmonious. The purpose
of the malice standard is to protect good-faith decisionmaking by,
348. Id at 139.
349. Id. at 136. Justice Buckley's modification of this standard would remove the
immunity when the judge acts in good faith but lacks jurisdiction because of negligence
concerning the jurisdictional facts or because of a mistake of law.
350. See Kates, supra note 4, at 623-24; Immunity of Judges, supra note 4, at 767;
Liability of Judicial Officers, supra note 4, at 335-37.
351. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See sources cited note 350 supra.
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sanctioning only behavior outside the requirements of the judicial
office because of ill-will or of gross neglect. The New York Times
malice test may be somewhat broader than the malice standard
used at common law, although some states used a doctrine of
constructive malice for extremely injudicious behavior that may
3 52
amount to the same thing.
3. The Judicial-ProcessApproach. - Justices Stewart and
Powell, in their dissents in Stump, 3 presented a critique of Justice White's opinion that contained an alternative rule of judicial
immunity. That rule takes the nature of the act that is the subject
of the litigation and its appealability as the factors that set the
limits of judicial immunity. Together, these two factors emphasize the importance of observing accepted judicial procedures as
the basis of immunity.
The essence of the judicial process approach is that a judge
will be immune from suit for any action taken consistent with the
procedural standards normally expected of judges.3 54 The first
procedural requisite is jurisdiction. Justices Stewart and Powell
did not explore this concept in detail, but it is apparent that their
view is not a technical one. Instead, jurisdiction is satisfied if the
act taken can be said to be one "normally performed by a judge."
The words are Justice White's,3 55 but Justice Stewart's interpretation of them is different from Justice White's. For Justice Stewart, the phrase embodies an imprecise notion that the act is
within a range of authority considered appropriate for a judge by
traditional practice and general agreement. 5
352. See notes 194-95 and accompanying text supra.
353. 435 U.S. at 364-70.
354. What is left undeveloped in the opinions of Justices Stewart and Powell is the
rule of liability to be applied when the court determines the absence of the factors that
would cause immunity to attach. In Stump, the normal liability rules of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) presumably would apply. In cases brought in state courts as common-law damage
actions, general tort principles would apply and therefore either intent, recklessness, or
probably even negligence would render the judge liable to damages. To some extent,
therefore, the judicial-process approach is different from the good-faith and malice approaches because, strictly speaking, it contains only a rule of immunity and not rules of
liability as well. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
355. 435 U.S. at 362.
356. Id. at 365-67. In Stump, for example, Justice White considered Judge Stump's
action "normal" as a decision on a petition, and particularly on a petition regarding a

minor not specifically excluded by the Indiana general grant of jurisdiction. Justice Stewart was more concerned with the specific action, an order for sterilization. Because he
regarded that action so exceptional that it was outside the scope of accepted conduct, he
would have denied immunity.
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To develop the other standards expected of judges, Justice
Stewart considered "the factors that support immunity from liability for the performance of [a judicial] act. ' 37 Relying on the
summary of those factors in Piersonv. Ray, 31s
he enumerated the
presence of litigants in an actual case, principled decisionmaking
by the judge, and the possibility of appellate review. Judges are
immunized to ensure their ability to engage in independent decisionmaking and, in an adversary system, those features are essential to that function. 5 ' Justice Powell emphasized the last factor
in his separate dissent, stating that a foundation of the judicial
immunity doctrine as expressed in Bradley and other cases is that
the vindication of private rights in a civil action is unnecessary
because of other avenues available to vindicate those rights. 6
-The judicial-process approach differs from the good-faith
and malice approaches in its emphasis on objective characteristics of the judge's action and it differs from the rule in Stump in
its emphasis on more precise procedural protections as the test
for judicial immunity. Those emphases make it an attractive alternative to the other doctrines. To explain our preference for it,
we now turn to the policy analysis of the judicial liability issue.
C. The Policy Pictures
The choice among the present immunity doctrine and any of

the three alternatives should be made by weighing the relative
advantages and disadvantages of each. In this section, we begin
the policy analysis of the judicial liability problem by presenting
the relevant policy concerns. At the risk of repeating ourselves,
we first emphasize two arguments for a rule of judicial immunity
that probably would be generally regarded as spurious. The first
such argument is historical precedent. As has been previously
stated, until modern times, judicial immunity was a limited doctrine. In any case, the past does not strike us as a very persuasive
point of argument in this case. A rule of judicial immunity does
not appear to be so central to our system of justice that its altera357. Id. at 365-69.
358. 386 U.S. 547, 554 (;967).
359. 435 U.S. at 368-69. In Stump, since no parties were adverse, no issue was in
dispute, the judge did not present "even the pretext of principled decisionmaking," and
his decision negated the possibility of appeal, that decision was not a judicial act and
therefore provided no immunity.
360. Id. at 369-70. In Stump, the judge's action foreclosed any other method of review. Thus, the basic assumption of immunity was undercut.
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tion would be a most significant step, nor is it the type of legal
rule concerning which significant public or private expectations
have arisen; therefore, changing the rule would not disappoint
extant expectations. Judges, those most affected, probably have
a general idea of their immunity from suit"' and alteration of the
rule would disappoint their expectations to some extent, but the
effects of anything short of wholesale revision would not inevitably be disastrous.
The second such argument is the necessity of extending judicial immunity to resolve the inconsistent treatment of different
judges. Throughout most of history, superior court judges had a
broader immunity than inferior court judges, but by the early
twentieth century, that inconsistency was removed and all judges
were treated similarly. As was much debated at the time, the
inconsistency may have been indefensible, but that does not explain, as a matter of logic or policy, why the immunity of superior
judges was extended to inferior judges and not the liability of
inferior judges extended to superior judges. Only on historical
grounds can we begin to understand why the general rule today
is immunity, not liability, and those grounds are not persuasive
in the final analysis.
We must extract the better reasons advanced in support of
the doctrine of judicial immunity from a variety of sources, judicial and scholarly. It is insufficient simply to refute the arguments of Justice White in Stump or Justice Field in Bradley.
Instead, the entire body of law and commentary on judicial liability in England and America is our source. Our investigation leads
to the development of a view of the judicial system that provides
the context for policy discussion of judicial liability. Two pictures
together comprise the argument for judicial immunity and
against judicial liability:"'2 a picture of the present judicial system operating under a rule of judicial immunity that protects all
judicial acts broadly defined, and a scenario of how the judicial
system would operate under a doctrine of judicial liability. Those
dissatisfied with judicial immunity and favoring some form of
limited liability view the situation differently. Their perception
361. This general expectation without reference to a particular knowledge of the law
supports the idea presented earlier that the law embodies an existing reality. See notes
206-08 and accompanying text supra.
362. Of course, "liability" and "immunity" are used here not as absolutes, but as
degrees of liability. See note 1 supra.
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of the existing situation is less appealing than that held by those
favoring immunity, and the scenario of limited immunity consequently less horrifying. We now present those conflicting views
before turning to a criticism of this entire approach to the problem.1. The Case for JudicialImmunity. - Proponents of judicial immunity view the judicial system as it now operates as one
in which most judges act reasonably, though not always correctly,
most of the time. There are no widespread problems of judicial
incompetence, vindictiveness, misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance. Judicial errors can be corrected by appellate review and
the few cases of misconduct or incompetence that do occur can
be effectively remedied either by public procedures such as impeachment, or, in the most extraordinary cases, by private action
within one of the few exceptions to the doctrine of immunity.
Contrasted to this placid picture of a system in equilibrium
is the scenario of what would occur if judges were liable to civil
suit. In this view, nearly every lawsuit leaves at least one of the
parties dissatisfied with the result, and the disappointed party or
parties will attribute the problem not to the lack of merit in the
cause but to some malfunction in the process itself, with the most
visible source of this putative malfunction being the judge. The
party's disappointment will cause a search for judicial wrongdoing and, in the party's frequently vengeful state, some wrongdoing will be perceived. Either error, incompetence, bias, or malice
will be attributed to the judge by the party, as the situation
allows and as the cause of action against the judge requires. The
result of the party's perception of injury frequently will be a civil
action against the judge. The number of these actions will be
enormous since at least one party to ne aly every legal proceeding
will want to bring such an action. Furthbr, the total will increase
geometrically as the disgruntled party proceeds through the system. If an action against the first judge is unsuccessful, the failure
will be attributed to a wrong committed by the second judge,
against whom an action also may be brought, and so on ad
363. As our presentation in this section is synthetic we do not cite to authority at each
point. The elements of the pictures that comprise the case for judicial immunity are drawn
primarily from the judicial opinions cited throughout as favoring immunity of one sort or
another. Other statements of the policy favoring immunity are included in the contemporary scholarly literature, which is also the principal source for the arguments against
judicial immunity. See note 4 supra. The pictures presented are somewhat exaggerated
but fairly present the ideal types from which the arguments proceed.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss2/4

66

1980]

Feinman and Cohen:SUING
Suing Judges:
History and Theory
JUDGES

infinitum. These suits cannot be screened out by the system, for
any doctrine of immunity but the most broad will require an
inquiry into particular facts before the validity of an action
against a judge can be determined.
Thus, the systemic effects of a rule of liability, in this view,
would be drastic. The multitude of actions brought against judges
would clog the courts, impeding the flow of other judicial business. The disruption would be greater than that caused by a
similarly sized body of litigation of some other kind because each
case would involve two judges and not one, the presiding judge
and the defendant, who would be diverted from normal judicial
duties by the necessity of reconstructing the decisional processes
at the time of the contested act, giving testimony, conferring with
counsel, and otherwise presenting a defense. These burdens
would consume scarce resources, including both judicial time and
state funds, particularly if the government indemnifies the judge
for damages recovered.
The effects on judges would be just as disastrous according
to the proponents of this view. Judicial liability would endanger
the independent, fearless, principled decisionmaking in which
judges must engage. Judges would be less free to make decisions
if they were in fear of having their motives misconstrued in subsequent actions. Weighing into each judicial decision would be not
only the merits of a case, but also the probability that the losing
party would bring suit and the judge's position if that contingency materialized. Judges would be motivated to practice defensive decisionmaking, taking extra precautions in every matter
solely for the purpose of building a record to vindicate their decisions upon later scrutiny. Furthermore, these fears would extend
to prospective judges and would discourage lawyers from seeking
or accepting judicial appointments to avoid awkward, tiresome,
and embarrassing public examination of their every act.
The final detrimental impact. of a system of judicial liability
would be the degradation of the judiciary in the eyes of the public. A significant aspect of the legitimacy of the judicial office and
the effectiveness of the judicial system results from the esteem in
which the citizenry holds the judiciary. Subjecting judges to
many vexatious suits and examining their acts both in public and
in the public press would certainly cause a loss of stature. This
is especially true when, as a result of the vagaries of the jury
system or the inevitability of occasional error, judges were forced
to pay damages, a form of public penance for wrongdoing as well
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as compensation to an injured plaintiff.
2. The Case for Judicial Liability. - Given the current
state of the law, the case for judicial liability takes the form of a
critique of the present situation and a refutation of the liability
scenario drawn by the advocates of continued immunity. The
alternative view of the present state of affairs assumes that most
judges act properly most of the time, and therefore judicial liability will not be an everyday threat. At present, however, when
error or wrongdoing does occur, .mechanisms other than private
actions against a judge are inadequate remedies. Appellate review often comes too late to redress the wrong done a party,
providing little or no compensation for the harm done, and, to the
extent that liability is intended to punish the judge and to deter
future wrongful conduct, appellate review is ineffective. Further,
under the judicial immunity doctrine defined in Stump, appellate review will be completely unavailable in some cases. Public
forms of sanction, such as censure or removal from office, by
contrast, serve the retributive function but provide no compensation for the injured party, and these sanctions are notoriously
cumbersome in application and are effective only in rare cases.
On the other hand, in the reformers' view, the world under a
system of liability would not be as bad as envisioned by those
favoring immunity. Litigants will be disappointed, of course, but
only in a relatively few cases will that disappointment breed vindictiveness or accusations of bias, malice, or other wrongdoing
against judges. Litigants are normal people, sometimes rational,
sometimes not, but no more prone to unreasonable conduct than
the rest of humanity. Even when a litigant's emotions are aroused
and the judge becomes the target of those emotions, a civil action
will not ensue as a matter of course because the economic costs
of such a suit will be significant, requiring a substantial outlay
of funds by the party, or, if brought under a contingent fee arrangement, of opportunity cost by counsel. At this point, the
limits of the particular rule of liability adopted become crucial,
determining the probability of success and the potential benefit.
Frivolous actions will be rare because of these costs and because
of the likely unwillingness of attorneys to participate in fruitless
causes, especially those that alienate judges and colleagues at the
bar. Finally, the hypothetical situation of an action being brought
against a judge and then another action against the judge who
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tries that action, and so forth, is unlikely to occur with any fre3 64
quency
Whatever costs will be incurred by the system are the necessary expenses of vindicating the party's rights and providing an
effective penalty for judicial misconduct. In the process, independent decisionmaking will not be sacrificed entirely to judicial
liability. The argument that judges will be more hesitant because
of the threat of suit ignores the realities of the situation and of
the judicial character. In most cases, the threat of suit would
come equally from both parties and thus no particular bias should
be present. Even when a particularly potent threat is present, the
moral fibre of most judges will be sufficiently strong to resist the
implicit pressure. Judges are subjected to many different pressures, both in particular cases and in general, and are quite able
to resist those pressures as they affect specific decisions. Even to
the extent that judges are unable to resist, the threat of litigation
will not be the greatest influence to which they are subject. Most
judges are subject to the basest of influences-election or political
appointment. Compared to the weight of these processes, the
hypothetical influence of civil action will be minimal. Moreover,
to the extent threatened litigation induces caution in the judge,
it may be beneficial. The costs of the administration of justice
may increase, but the price will not be too high if it ensures a
meticulous concern for the rights of parties and a check on judicial misconduct.
Nor, by this view, will a degradation of the judiciary in the
eyes of the public necessarily flow from a rule of liability. Recovery of damages from judicial tortfeasors may be degrading to
them, but only if an association is made between them and all
judges will the esteem of the entire judiciary be lowered. If only
a few such cases arise, the association will not be strong and the
degradation may be no greater than that arising from public
awareness of unpunished judicial wrongdoing. Indeed, the legal
process may be dignified by the public's knowledge that the judicial system can punish its own misfits and correct its own errors.
D.

The Policy Core

The policies and interests raised by the alternative views are
364. Unlikely, however, is not the same as impossible. For an account of just such a
case, see Foster v. Bork, 425 F. Supp. 1318 (D.D.C. 1977).
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numerous and overlapping. As presented in judicial opinions and
scholarly commentaries, the issues are complicated and almost
unmanageable. The policy debate, however, may be reduced to
disagreement on a few basic points, a policy core common to
every examination of this problem, which can be the vehicle for
deciding between the various alternatives.
There are three elements in the policy core of the judicial
liability problem: first, the magnitude of the harm done to victims of judicial wrongdoing; second, the costs of enforcing a liability rule; and third, the impact of the liability rule on the execution of the function of the judicial process." 5 Each of these three
elements entails some of the basic issues in the judicial liability
debate, and together they provide the core on which the policy
debate will be settled, if settlement is possible. The weight of the
first factor, the magnitude of the harm done to parties by judges,
depends on the seriousness of the problem, that is, the number
of instances of judicial misconduct and the amount of injury
caused in those instances, and the effectiveness of other forms of
review, such as appeal and removal from office, in preventing and
redressing harm and punishing judicial wrongdoing. The second
factor, the costs of enforcing a particular liability rule, comprises
the number of private actions brought and their effects, the degree of distortion of the decisionmaking process caused by the
threat of liability, and the difficulty of the factfinding process
imposed by the liability rule. The third factor, the impact of the
liability rule on the judicial process, concerns the products of the
process, public and private dispute resolution, and justice. 66
Thus, the tests for any rule of judicial liability, present or
proposed, are whether it increases or decreases the harm done to
persons by judicial misbehavior, the cost of reducing that harm,
and the quantum of justice produced by the judicial process.
Generally, decreasing the first two elements and increasing the
third would be socially useful; increasing the first two and decreasing the third would be harmful. Any variation from those
two possibilities necessitates evaluation of the relative costs and
365. The statement of the core elements is adapted from Baxter, EnterpriseLiability,
Public and Private,42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 45 (1978). The issue of Law and Contemporary Problems in which the Baxter article appears is devoted to the topic of official
immunity.
366. Dispute resolution is involved in this issue only to the extent that the costs on
the system make the dispute resolution process less effective; the central part of the third
factor is the justice done by the execution of a liability rule.
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benefits of each of the factors. 67 In that case, the elements of the
policy core are the focus for disagreement between supporters of
immunity and proponents of a more expanded liability. The conflicts are conflicts of factual prediction and of value. We now
discuss the rule in Stump and the reform proposals in an attempt
to resolve these conflicts.
E. The Policy Analysis
The choice on policy grounds among reform proposals, or
between any reform and the status quo, is made by measuring
each liability standard against the core policies. Presumably, the
result should be a conclusion, satisfactory to those who hold the
two differing views of the legal system previously described, concerning the liability standard that best balances the core policies
and achieves the most socially advantageous, that is, the most
just, result. Practically, however, that is not the result. Although
we can suggest the direction of influence on the first two elements
for each of the alternative liability rules, the degree of change is
not subject to empirical verification. The third element creates
even greater difficulty because it is value-based and therefore
incapable of rational determination.
1. Magnitude of Harm. - The first issue in the policy core
is the extent to which reform of the rule in Stump would decrease
the harm done to parties by judicial misconduct. Here, the two
camps disagree on the starting point, namely how much harm is
done to parties under the current rule. That disagreement, of
course, influences their beliefs concerning the extent to which any
improvement is necessary or possible, but both sides do agree on
the direction of change under each of the reform proposals. Both
perceive that a wider liability rule would induce more caution in
judges and consequently prevent some misbehavior that otherwise would occur. Indeed, one of the principal arguments against
liability is that it would create excessive caution and thus interfere with independent decisionmaking.
The deterrent effect of a liability rule will vary with the type
of behavior addressed. No rule of liability can deter irrational
conduct, but most acts complained of seem to be not wholly
irrational, but either motivated by prejudice, bias, anger, or illwill, or the result of inattention, neglect of duty, or incompetence.
367. Baxter, supra note 365, at 45-46.
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The fear of liability may influence the judge to exercise restraint
with the first group and spur a judge to take more care in the
second, thus having a positive effect in both cases.
The good-faith approach and the. malice approach are similar
in conception, though different in focus, and will have similar
effects on judicial wrongdoing. They will have some deterrent
effect on judges who otherwise would act maliciously. Focusing
on the judge's state of mind as manifested by his behavior, these
approaches will require some subterfuge by judges who attempt
to deliberately violate the rights of parties if liability is to be
avoided; in some cases, subterfuge is not likely because of the lack
of a proper judicial temperament, the source of the problem in the
first place, and there will be an imposition of liability that remedies the particular harm and has some deterrent effect on judicial
behavior in general. A major deterrent effect would be provided
by the New York Times variation on actual malice or an equivalent objective or procedural formulation of good faith. A standard
that provides immunity only if certain safeguards are met will
channel potentially aberrant behavior into desired forms and a
"reckless disregard" test will influence some judges to take sufficient precautions to avoid running afoul of the test. This presumably will improve the quality of decisionmaking and reduce the
incidence of abuse.
The judicial-process approach contains procedural and substantive safeguards, with each having differing impacts on the
prevention of improper judicial acts. If the procedural lesson is
learned, instances of harm due to neglect will decrease significantly. Channelling judicial activity into accepted paths provides
both a lower likelihood of wrongful injuries to parties and a
greater opportunity to correct the wrongs. This approach is especially useful in preventing what may be the worst situation, when,
as in Stump, the judge's act has irreversible consequences yet-is
hidden from review. The effect of the substantive aspect of the
judicial-process approach is less certain. The notion of liability
for a function "not normally performed by a judge" or lacking
"principled decisionmaking" is a more general threat. Because it
is more general, it may influence a broader range of situations,
but because it is less specific, its impact may be less keen. Much
would depend on the content given to the terms in practice, demonstrating the willingness of judges to impose liability on each
other.
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2. Costs of Enforcing Sanctions. - The second element of
the policy core is the cost of a rule of liability. The key here is
the ease with which the proof process can implement the liability
standard. The scope of the liability standard will determine the
likelihood of success of a suit and the ease of disposition of unwarranted suits, which will be the principal determinants of the
number of suits brought and the systemic costs of those suits. A
secondary cost is the loss of judicial independence from an expanded rule of liability.
The rule in Stump, if construed as broadly as apparently
intended by the majority, minimizes the costs to the system by
allowing an early disposition of most suits. Despite the indeterminacy of the terms of the rule, the thrust of the rule is to make
success unlikely in any suit against a judge. The greatest fear of
advocates of such a broad rule of immunity is that anything less
will open the floodgates to a stream of frivolous litigation that will
not be possible to check.
As a general principle, the wider and the more uncertain a
liability standard is, the greater the costs of avoiding spurious or
unmeritorious claims. Anything less than a nearly complete rule
of immunity, as in Stump, carries the potential for litigation that
will proceed through the system and require elaborate factfinding
and judicial participation before decision. Thus, the costs of the
good-faith and malice tests will be great. The attempt to prove
actual malice is a quagmire that inevitably will involve expenditure of enormous judicial resources, and even the type of secondorder inquiry into the judge's ability to explain a departure from
normal processes, as required by the New York Times standard,
seldom will be capable of decision prior to proof. The costs of
either test will therefore be great.
Stump is useful as an example. One of the striking features
of both reported decisions in Stump is that Judge Stump himself
remains an unknown quantity. The record tells us nothing about
him beyond the formal characteristics of his position and the
action he took. Imagine Stump litigated under a good-faith or
malice standard. The necessary inquiry would include evidence
taken in discovery and at trial on his assumption of jurisdiction,
his failure to give notice to Linda or appoint a guardian pendente
lite, his failure to enter the case in the court record, and so forth.
It is hard to imagine how the case could have been concluded
without a full trial.
The judicial-process approach, strictly construed, because it
Published by Scholar Commons, 1980
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has the most narrow and most concrete liability standard, will be
a more effective check on vexatious but unmeritorious litigation.
The factual claims of plaintiffs may be speculative, but seldom
will they be knowingly untrue; even false claims of a failure to
adhere to procedural safeguards can be disposed of at an early
stage of litigation with little factfinding by any of a number of
pretrial motions. The cost of a limited exception to the immunity
principle for cases such as Stump would therefore not be great.
The costs increase with any extension of liability beyond mere
failure to provide procedural due process. Even Justice Stewart's
extension to "functions not normally performed by a judge" and
"lack of principled decisionmaking" makes much more difficult
the distinction of spurious claims from meritorious ones because
of legal and factual intricacies.
The second cost of a rule of liability is the loss of judicial
independence from fear of civil suit and civil liability. Here, the
direction of variation with particular liability standards is clear.
The disagreement of proponents and opponents of liability on this
point is evident from the presentation of the policy pictures; the
cost, however great or small, again will increase directly with the
exposure to liability and inversely with the certainty of the liability test.
3. Effect on Justice. - The third element of the policy core
is the effect of the liability standard on the quantum of justice in
society. This has been characterized as "the insurmountable barrier to a satisfactory analysis of the problem because of the impossibility of achieving agreement on the definition of justice and the
costs that should be incurred to attain it."3' We adopt that char-

acterization; the intractable nature of this element is symptomatic of a fundamental contradiction in the legal process and, in
turn, the existence of that contradiction helps explain the decisional patterns demonstrated in earlier judicial liability cases.
From this point forward then, we build our argument to its resolution, concluding the policy analysis of the judicial liability problem and discussing policy argumentation in the legal system generally and then re-examining the way judges have responded to
the judicial liability problem. Finally, the results of that examination will be linked to broader thoughts on the legal system.
A useful way of illustrating the 'dilemma arising from the
368. Id. at 46.
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third element of the policy core is by presenting individual cases
and analyzing them under that element. We choose four recent
cases, the facts somewhat simplified and stylized, which are
largely representative of the range of judicial liability cases. The
cases are: Gregory v. Thompson,"9 in which a judge physically
assaulted a visitor to his courtroom by forcibly removing him;
Zarcone v. Perry,370 in which a judge who had been served
"putrid" coffee by a vendor ordered the vendor seized and
brought before him in handcuffs to be harangued by the judge;
Stump v. Sparkman,3 7 1 in which a judge, acting on a mother's
petition, ordered the sterilization of a minor without notice, hearing, or opportunity to appeal; and Sirros v. Moore,3 2 in which a
judge ordered the arrest and detention of an alien, an act that
would have been lawful if he had asserted jurisdiction over the
underlying matter regarding which the alien first came before
him, but which was unlawful because he stated that he lacked
jurisdiction over that matter.
Consider first how these cases would be decided under each
of the possible liability rules. Implicit in each decision is a policy
judgment that justice is increased by immunization or the imposition of liability considering the harm done to the parties and the
cost of imposing liability under each rule. On those grounds,
Gregory and Sirros are the cases that demarcate the range of
agreement of those who have previously addressed the issue. The
tests of the majority in Stump and the judicial-process, goodfaith, and malice approaches would render liable the defendant
in Gregory, but not the judge in Sirros. Gregory fails under each
test because assault is not a judicial act under any accepted construction and also fails under the good-faith and malice tests
because of the judge's state of mind. Sirros, on the other hand, is
a case in which immunity would apply because it was a judicial
act within the general jurisdiction of the court under the Stump
test, because the act was one normally performed by a judge and
was discharged in accordance with accepted procedures under the
judicial process test, and because the state of mind of the judge
was acceptable under the good-faith and malice approaches.
Disputes over the third element of the policy core arise in
369.
370.
371.
372.

500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974).
572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1977).
435 U.S. 349 (1978).
[19751 1 Q.B. 118 (C.A.).
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those cases within the range set by Gregory and Sirros. Zarcone
at first might seem like a clear case of liability under the judicialprocess, good-faith, and malice approaches; more interesting,
however, is the treatment of Zarcone under the rule in Stump. If
we alter the facts in Zarcone to make Judge Perry a judge of
general jurisdiction with a grant of jurisdiction equivalent to that
of Judge Stump,"' his action in summoning and abusing Zarcone
was arguably within his jurisdiction and was a function normally
performed by a judge-punishment of a contempt. Although the
incident did not arise out of a pending case and was never entered
on the docket, those factors are not determinative since they were
not present in Stump. Thus, Judge Perry, who was removed from
the bench for his conduct,"' might not be liable to a civil action
for the same conduct.
We have an intuitive reaction that this argument is unsound,
and that Judge Perry should be liable. Of course, intuitive reactions are not to be trusted as predictive devices'; we would have
had the same reaction to Stump. But we suspect that others
would share our reaction, including the defenders, and perhaps
even the authors, of the rule in Stump. The point of the present
discussion is to explore that reaction. A decision for liability in
Zarcone, taking Stump as the controlling authority, certainly
need not be justified solely on intuitive grounds. Lawyerly distinctions could be made in delineating the ambit of either
"jurisdiction" or "judicial act." The reality of the distinction
would not be based on those grounds, but rather on the reaction
that Judge Stump's conduct was sufficiently judicial that he
ought to be protected, while Judge Perry's conduct was so unjudicial that he ought to be liable.
The point may be made more clearly this way. What we are
discussing is a tort action. We use Prosser's statement of the
general nature of torts as a starting point:
[L]iability must be based upon conduct which is socially unreasonable. The common thread woven into all torts is the idea
of unreasonable interference with the interest of others ....
The tort-feasor usually is held liable because he has acted with
373. Judge Perry was a county district court judge sitting in traffic court. 581 F.2d
at 1040.
374. In re Perry, 53 A.D.2d 882, 385 N.Y.S.2d 589, appeal dismissed, 40 N.Y.2d 1079,
360 N.E.2d 964, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1029 (1976).
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an unreasonable intention, or5 because he has departed from a
reasonable standard of care.11
The intuitive judgment suggested above is that Judge Perry's
conduct was socially unreasonable, but that judgment is not necessarily arrived at by a careful weighing of the nature of the
judicial process and the immunity of judges derived from that
process. For Justice White in Stump, a judge's action is unreasonable only when the judge departs from a standard of care defined
by jurisdiction, most broadly construed, and the concept of functions normally performed by a judge, equally broadly construed.
In our altered version of Zarcone, then, liability will attach only
if the act is not within Judge Perry's jurisdiction. Because of the
vagueness of Justice White's application of the jurisdictional
standard, that determination can be made in only two ways:
either Judge Perry is immune because "all cases in law and equity" means all cases, no matter how irregular or implausible, or
he is liable because he failed to adhere to the standard of care and
exceeded our conception of acceptable conduct, for reasons that
cannot be precisely identified or supported and that certainly do
not follow by entailment from either the jurisdictional statute or
the statement of the rule of immunity.
To complete the scheme, each of the three alternative liability standards has a different definition of reasonableness and,
consequently, of the justice of sanctioning conduct defined as
unreasonable. The good-faith approach ostensibly relies on the
judge's intention, a reasonable intention being a bona fide effort
to act judicially, that is, independently, carefully, and without
bias, but if its authors were required to further articulate the test
they might also draw on the malice approach, which is concerned
not only with the intention of the judge, but also with his adherence to a substantive and procedural standard of care defined in
New York Times as something short of reckless disregard. The
procedural aspect of the judicial process approach defines the
standard of care as requiring adherence to traditional procedural
safeguards, but the substantive aspect of that approach relies on
the same kind of vague determination of appropriateness as the
Stump test.
Considering Stump in this context, Judge Stump acted sufficiently within his authority and the ambit of normal judicial
375. W.

PRossm,

supra note 5, at 6.
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action to bring him within the Stump immunity rule. Under the
judicial-process approach, however, Judge Stump's action was
unreasonable because of the irregularity of proceeding and the
impossibility of appeal. On the third policy ground, justice, how
is a choice to be made between these two views of Stump? The
answer is more than unknown, it is imponderable. Much recent
literature has argued that a basic tenet of modern social theory,
including modern legal theory, is that values are subjective and
arbitrary." 8 Values are subjective because they are solely a matter
of individual choice and they are arbitrary because once the
choice is made little is left to be said. Values are not subject to
rational debate or discussion and one person can rarely persuade
another of the rightness of certain values because of the irreconcilable antinomy of reason and value. Accepting this antinomy,
the impossibility of an unequivocal response to the question
posed becomes clear. The choice between a doctrine that embodies a goal of maximum judicial autonomy and one that expresses
the value of conformity to established procedures is subjective
and therefore indeterminate.
We can further complicate the matter by considering Stump
under the good-faith and malice approaches. Both tests require
some inquiry into the judge's motivation, but the case as reported, being unconcerned with that issue, provides insufficient
facts for making that inquiry now. Assuming the facts were available, we would ask several questions including whether Judge
Stump thought he could exercise his powers as he did, whether
he made any inquiry into the applicable law, and whether he was
motivated by any prejudices. These are factual matters on which
we presumably could arrive at a generally acceptable conclusion.
If good faith was lacking, or reckless disregard was evident, then
these two tests would impose liability. The decision to do so involves value choices at two levels: first, that liability would be
just as a general matter and, second, that liability would be just
given the costs imposed on the legal system. Even if a value could
be placed on the third element of the policy core, the resolution
of the policy formula requires a weighing of the costs of a liability
rule against the benefits. Weighing implies a scale, an objective
measure, but the choice among competing values is itself reflective of more basic values and is therefore subjective and arbitrary.
376. See R. UNGER, supra note 208, at 67-81, 119-21; Form and Substance, supra note
208, at 1767-71; Legal Formality, supra note 208, at 363.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss2/4

78

1980]

SUING
Feinman and Cohen:
Suing JUDGES
Judges: History and Theory

The experiences of those involved in the resolution of this issue
are sufficiently related that their values, though subjective, may
be commonly held. Each decisionmaker values compensating injured parties, sanctioning wrongdoers, and maintaining the efficiency of the legal system, but when those common values conflict, as in the judicial liability context, no independent means of
resolving the conflict is available."' Accordingly, Justice White's
resolution of the conflict in Stump is valid on its own terms as
are the resolutions achieved by the judicial-process, good-faith
and malice approaches.
Values are subjective and arbitrary, but because values are
products of experience, common experiences often will produce
common values.7 8 We can all therefore agree that the value of
judicial independence is not much involved in Gregory, but it
certainly is in Sirros. In the intermediate cases, we are torn between conflicting values. Even though our argument to this point
suggests that we are unwilling to assert that our conclusions are
definitive, we argue that Stump was wrongly decided. Anyone
who examines the cases is likely to agree on Gregory and Sirros,
and it is our opinion that most of the legal community and society
at large would agree on Stump as well. In Stump, we can assign
approximate weights to each element of the policy core and most
observers would agree that the small added cost of the second
element is outweighed by the advantages of liability in the first
and third elements. It is our belief that the decision in Stump
should be rejected as too protective of judicial prerogative because it violates a basic tenet of the legal process - the right of
review - when there would be little cost to the legal system from
imposing liability.
Thus, Justice Powell's emphasis on the importance of appealability is persuasive to us. The majority's conclusion, whatever the strengths or weaknesses of the process that produced it,
is simply undesirable. In this assertion we do not mean to propose
a universal theory of judging that requires adherence to widely
held values. We do not conclude that Stump was wrong because
it was out of step with generally held beliefs or that the proper
pattern for a court is to express values and then measure the
response to determine if the values are widely held.3 7 We simply
377. Cf. R. UNGER, supra note 208, at 100-03.

378. Cf. E.

CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJusncE 22-27 (Midland Book ed. 1974).
379. But cf. G. WHirE, supra note 308, at 158-61.
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state that the alternative result would have been preferable, in
our opinion. That opinion is shaped by our view that human
dignity and the redress of wrongful injury, especially in so serious
a case, are of higher value than what we perceive to be marginal
costs to the legal system of contrary decisions in cases such as
Stump.
4. Summary. - To summarize, what we have attempted to
do is to resolve a typical doctrinal question by using a standard
policy analysis. Having identified the interests implicated, however, we find that conflicts among them could not be resolved.
The magnitude of the harm caused by judicial wrongdoing is a
matter of fact on which there is no agreement. The systemic costs
of any liability standard are also factual issues, but are not subject to prediction with any degree of certainty. Finally, the moral
desirability of any liability rule is not capable of rational resolution. Individually, therefore, the elements of the policy core defy
resolution of the judicial liability problem. Any attempt at balancing the various elements is similarly fruitless. On the particular facts in Stump, however, a resolution of sorts is possible, and
that resolution suggests a partial solution to the larger problem
as well. Application of the procedural aspect of the judicialprocess approach to the judicial immunity question would be
consonant with commonly held beliefs about the rights of parties
and the limits of judges' power without imposing on the judicial
system any great burden of excessive litigation or complicated
factfinding. Accordingly, a partial answer to the judicial liability
problem would be to hold liable judges who depart from traditional procedural protections-notice, opportunity to be heard,
and, particularly, the right of review.
Adoption of this position would eliminate some of the injustice of the Stump doctrine, but this position addresses only a
limited number of the common types of judicial wrongdoing. In
our judgment, a more comprehensive solution requires taking the
problem to a more fundamental level.
V.

SYNTHESIS: FORM AND SUBSTANCE

We have suggested interpretations of key aspects of the history of judicial liability doctrine, but history provides no simple
resolution. Policy analysis is inevitably inconclusive, although we
have hinted at a way out of the confusion. We also have suggested
that the rule of liability ought at least to be altered to avoid the
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injustice of a situation such as Stump in which no review of the
judge's action was available. In this final section, we synthesize
the interpretive history and the policy in light of some contemporary jurisprudence to argue that the problem is both more complex yet more accessible than it has previously appeared.
Consider first the legal form common to most expressions of
the doctrine of judicial liability and judicial immunity - the
rule. A rule contemplates a mechanical decision process that, at
its best, renders the decisionmaker passive, a process in which the
decisionmaker merely ascertains objective facts and the rule
states explicitly and precisely the result to follow from its application to the facts. The extent to which this degree of explicitness
and precision can be achieved is described as the formal realizability of the rule. The opposite of a rule is a standard, principle,
or policy, the application of which is as indeterminate as the
application of a rule is determinate. A standard states a substantive objective of the legal system without specifying the facts to
which it should be applied or the method and result of applying
it.380
Commonly, judicial liability and immunity doctrines are
expressed as rules, not standards. The recurrent element in all
statements of the liability doctrine is the concept of judicial act;
other elements of the tests have included concepts of superior or
inferior court and the excess/absence of jurisdiction dichotomy.
In the minds of the judges, as revealed by their opinions, these
concepts are elements of rules, not standards, making judicial
liability cases simple questions of logical entailment.
To take a particular example, recall Justice Field's doctrinal
proclamation in Bradley v. Fisher:
[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not
liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts
are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been
done maliciously or corruptly. A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all
8
jurisdiction over the subject matter. 1
This statement contemplates that the court in a damage action
380. See R.

UNGER,

supra note 208, at 63-103; Form and Substance, supra note 208;

Legal Formality, supra note 208. See also R. DwoRKm,

TAKNG RIGHTS SEIuousLY (1977);

Chase, supra note 342; Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
381. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871).
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against a judge will make the factual determination that the
defendant is a judge of superior or general jurisdiction and that
the act complained of was judicial and was within the judge's
jurisdiction or merely in excess of jurisdiction. Once that determination is made, the operation of the rule renders the result automatic. If the pertinent facts are not found to be present, the
opposite result is equally automatic. In either case, there can be
no resort to arguments about the purposes to be served by the
rule, its effectiveness in serving those purposes in the case, or any
particular equities in the individual case.
One difficulty with this approach immediately presents itself. The ideal rule is wholly determinate, but in reality every rule
is partly indeterminate. This is one element in a thorough critique of the system of adjudication. We do not address that critique here,"' but at a more immediate level, rules in the judicial
liability area are among the easiest to criticize for their lack of
formal realizability.
Using Field's rule as an example, the first step in the rule
application process is the determination of the operative.premises
of the rule. As we have seen, the concept of a court of superior
jurisdiction was indeterminate throughout American judicial history. A court of general jurisdiction may be a more simple concept, but it again is not unequivocal. 83 For example, does a federal district court qualify? A federal district court has limited
jurisdiction, but general jurisdiction within its limits. The way
this question normally would be decided is by considering
whether the purposes of judicial immunity would be served by
bringing a federal judge within the Field test, but once the necessity of that inquiry is admitted, the approach becomes a standard
and not a rule.
The objection may be made that the problem is merely one
of inadequate definition, that the type of judge immunized could
be described in the rule with greater specificity. This objection
loses all force when we turn to the other operative premises of the
rule. What, for example, is a judicial act? In light of the relevant
case law, we think the courts use the term to describe any type
of behavior sufficiently close to normal judicial conduct to be
deserving of immunization, given the purposes of judicial immunity. This usage indicates that the test is a standard, not a rule.
382. See generally R. UNGER, supra note 208.
383. See note 338 supra.
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This is an especially clear instance of the difficulty of stating a
rule with enough clarity so that it can be applied with the ease
contemplated by rule-oriented jurisprudence.
As should be evident from this discussion, the distinction
between the legal forms of rules and standards parallels the distinction between the rhetorical styles of formalism and instxumentalism.3 84 Practically, neither distinction separates the opposing concepts completely, but each distinction is useful analytically if viewed as a bipolar continuum of concepts. Thus, statements of policy may be found in a rule-oriented, formalist opinion, but that does not negate its basic quality. Each of these
concepts is really a pattern of thought, not a description of personal character, and we would therefore expect to find judges
expressing conflicting tendencies, although frequently one or the
other tendency will be dominant.
From Kent's decision in Yates v. Lansing at least through
Field's opinion in Bradley v. Fisher, most doctrinal statements
were cast as rules. 85 The distinction between superior and inferior
courts was the keystone of the doctrine, and the main subsidiary
element was the scope of jurisdiction of an inferior court. The
threshold question was whether the act complained of was judicial, but that seems to have been easily resolved in most cases.
Thereafter, the rule purported to decree results upon determination of the factual issues. For example, if the judge is inferior and
has acted outside his jurisdiction, liability attaches. The courts'
conception of the process was quite clear: finding objective facts
provides material for the mechanical application of a rule. The
opinions are not without mention of policy, but the mention is
merely superficial; the policy discussion was formulaic and had
little effect on the decisions. Moreover, the policy discussion went
to the justification for a basic doctrine of immunity and seldom
to the issue of the limits of the doctrine, if any, as raised by the
facts in the instant case.
In Bradley, Field continued the rule-based jurisprudence of
judicial liability. His rule, however, was more complex than had
been common in prior cases. Field recognized that the prior rules
regarding lower court judges inadequately distinguished those situations in which extrajurisdictional acts should be actionable and
384. See notes 239-42 and accompanying text supra.
385. Throughout this discussion, we have not felt it necessary to cite our historical
discussion.
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those in which they should not be actionable, and he therefore
introduced the excess/absence of jurisdiction distinction. Consistent with his legal outlook, Field's distinction was still rule oriented; for Field, an objective determination of which cases fall
into which category was possible.
Following Bradley, a debate began over the law applicable to
lower court judges. Thomas Cooley was among the first to try to
reconcile on policy grounds the different treatment accorded superior and inferior judges. This attempt is evidence of at least
some concern for the irrationality of different treatment. Cooley's
defense of the older approach was refuted by courts and other
treatise writers, with the result that eventually that approach was
overthrown in favor of a unified treatment. What is important for
the present inquiry is that the raising of policy concerns for the
justification of the doctrine also should have caused some concern
about the formal approach of the courts. Why that concern failed
to occur in significant measure explains the choice of rule form.
Early courts could be satisfied with the rule form because it
was consistent with their formalistic approach to this issue and,
frequently, to all law. 86 When a court recognizes, however, that
the source of the law is concern for the protection of judges and
the legal system and for the other policy issues we have discussed,
it also must recognize that a rule is not necessarily the appropriate legal form. Instead, the choice of form as well as the choice
of result must be made on instrumental grounds, and those
grounds might be better served by a form that permits resort in
individual cases to the policies underlying liability and immunity. That form is, of course, a standard and not a rule. Any rule
will be either under- or over-inclusive, immunizing too little or
too much judicial behavior to fully achieve the policy results. A
standard, on the other hand, would allow an individualized inquiry in each case into the result that would best further the
underlying objectives of the doctrine of immunity. Despite this,
a rule was nearly always preferred to a standard as the form of
the liability doctrine and the preference was never explicitly considered.
We believe there are three possible explanations for the rule
preference. The first two explanations are tactical ones. First, on
any issue, the decision between rule and standard may be based
386. See M. HowRrmz, supra note 137, at 479.
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on the achievement of the objectives sought. There is a familiar
set of arguments over the utility of rules or standards in general
and in particular situations. 8 7 In the judicial liability area, the
explanation of the rule preference on tactical grounds is quite
simple. The assumption underlying immunity is that practically
any liability would unduly burden the judge and the judicial
process, that injuries caused to parties by judges must be uncompensated, and that judges can be sanctioned in other ways. The
essential purpose of the rule is thus to limit the occasions on
which a judge need fear liability. Values and rationality demand
that sometimes a judge must be held liable and thus the second
best immunity doctrine is an immunity rule of high generality.
Such a rule will be over-inclusive, but it will achieve the desired
effect; in other words, meritorious suits against judges are sacrificed to ensure that nonmeritorious suits are practically never
brought. Since the principal fear is the necessity of inquiry into
judicial behavior, a rule that approaches the poles of formal realizability and generality is appropriate. 88
A second tactical explanation concerns the legitimating
function of the rule. Neither rules nor standards are their own
justification, but from the judicial point of view, standards have
the disadvantage of overtly raising the policies involved in a case
and a doctrine. Rules, on the other hand, have a comforting certainty to them, especially when couched in terms that give the
appearance of inevitability and correctness. "Judicial act" is an
excellent example of such a term. A rule that a judge will be
immune for any "judicial act" is practically indisputable on its
face, and a court predisposed to immunity will need littl6 justification to find without reference to policy that anything short of
a physical assault is a judicial act. Further, the operative terms
of the rules give the illusion of certainty in the face of their indeterminacy, allowing a false sense of inevitability of decision. In
sum, the judicial immunity rules have used terms of deceiving
simplicity and power-judicial act, court of general jurisdiction,
and excess of jurisdiction - to legitimate, at least for lawyers and
judges, 39 decisions that might otherwise be regarded as unjust or,
387. Form and Substance, supra note 208, at 1694-1701.
388. This analysis applies with greater force to the broader immunity rules, such as
Stump, than to other rules, such as the early nineteenth-century liability rule for inferior
judges.
389. On the importance of ideology to the profession, see Tushnet, Perspectives on
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at least, questionable.
These two tactical explanations are plausible; there is, however, a third explanation for the rule preference that relates form
to substance. Duncan Kennedy has suggested that there are only
two ideologies, denominated individualism and altruism, that
encompass the range of theoretically possible legal positions on
any given set of facts."' Kennedy's description of individualism
holds that
the essence of individualism is the making of a sharp distinction
between one's interests and those of others, combined with the
belief that a preference in conduct for one's own interests is
legitimate, but that one should be willing to respect the rules
that make it possible to coexist with others similarly selfinterested."'
On the other hand, "the essence of altruism is the belief that one
ought not to indulge a sharp preference for one's own interest over
those of others. Altruism enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share,
3 92
and to be merciful.
Each of these is an attitude and a rhetorical mode, not a
characterization of individuals. Each of us, in our personal relations as well as our legal perceptions, is both individualistic and
altruistic. As individuals, we define and strive for what we value
without interference or assistance from other persons or the state.
The justification for doing so may be a conception of the good, or
the belief in the social utility of self-interest through the action
of the market mechanism, or the impossibility of defining any
values but subjective ones. As altruists, we identify our own interests with those of others and are willing to redistribute our own
gain, share other's losses, and act to further such conduct in the
future. Altruism is justified as inherently good, as a check on pure
egoism, and as an affirmation of the existence of shared values.
The difference, in essence, is one of caring and concern for others.
The opposing ideologies of individualism and altruism emthe Development of American Law: A CriticalReview of Friedman's "AHistory of American Law," 1977 Wis. L. REV. 81.
390. Form and Substance, supra note 208,'at 1713-22. For a modification and application of Kennedy's scheme that may be compared to our own, see Buse v. School Finance
Reform: A Case Study of the Doctrinal,Social, and Ideological Determinantsof Judicial
Decisionmaking, 1978 Wis. L. Ray. 1071.
391. Form and Substance, supra note 208, at 1713.
392. Id. at 1717 (emphasis in original).
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body opposed visions of the ideal. Each ideology presents in general outline the elements of a good society and each vision makes
a statement about the kind of individual conduct that will
achieve and maintain a society based on those elements and the
kind of legal system that will support, encourage, or coerce that
conduct. 93
The kind of legal system associated with individualism is one
of legal or procedural justice. Under such a regime, rules are
established to provide a framework for human activity, leaving
individuals largely free to order their own affairs, bearing their
own risk of gain or loss, and the devil take the hindmost. Legal
justice thus furthers the basic individualist principle, selfreliance, and its corollary, lack of concern for others. The kind of
legal system associated with altruism is one of substantive justice. Substantive justice embodies a concern for individuation in
adjudication, in which resort to policy objectives is frequent and
the concern is for achieving justice within the unique facts of a
particular case. This kind of system is expressive of the basic
altruist principles of sharing, sacrifice, and concern. Such a system also aims at these principles by sometimes encouraging such
action and sometimes negatively sanctioning the failure to so
394
act.
The basic thrust of the application of these principles as
stated is affirmative. Spurred by the legal system, people engage
in the type of behavior appropriate to the striving for a particular
vision of the good and the just. Another useful way of looking at
the interaction of ideologies in the legal system is to consider their
negative aspects. In terms of the human experience with each
ideology, an important aspect is the type of behavior the ideology
rejects as wrong or, at least, counterproductive. The distinction
between the affirmative and the negative may be exaggerated,
but it is convenient for analysis.
Edmond Cahn suggested in The Sense of Injustice a similar
393. Because individualist and altruist feelings and behavior are known to all of us,
we would expect the legal system to reflect those attitudes and that behavior. The application of Kennedy's theory to the present issue is problematic, however, because Kennedy
discusses only private law; although an action against a judge is a tort action, the defense
of judicial immunity is a public law matter. Because the theory is useful, the difference
in context requires only supplementation and extension, and not fundamental reformulation, but we note the point to emphasize that the application of the theory is ours, not
Kennedy's.
394. Cf. R. UNGER, supra note 208, at 89-100.
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distinction between justice and injustice as analytical devices.3 95
Justice is a static concept, representing the ideal as developed
through contemplation. The sense of injustice, though, is real and
visceral, arising out of the experience in life of recognizing and
confronting wrong. The ideal is then not a condition but an activity, the process of remedying injustice. The expression of individualism and altruism through the legal system takes parallel
forms. In the individualist mode, the courts are concerned with
removing obstacles to personal action and the parties' determination of their interests and with not imposing on individuals the
burdens of others. Likewise, in the altruist mode, the courts may
compensate for injuries by imposing nonconsensual duties, may
reallocate bargaining power, and may prevent or sanction individualist behavior by imposing sharing, sacrifice, and concern as
expressed in behavior.
What we saw throughout the American law of judicial liability was the predominance of individualism over altruism, both as
a matter of theory and in the practical delineation of the legal
doctrine. The predominance of individualism was reflected in the
principal substantive aspects of the law-the immunity of superior judges, the liability of lower judges, and the trend from liability to immunity-and in the form of doctrinal expression, the
rule.39
395. E. CAHN, supra note 378, at 13-14.
396. Our principal concern is the result a judge should reach when presented with a
judicial liability case. We have not developed what may be uf equal importance, the
process of conducting such a case. Our colleague Edward Chase has thoughtfully summarized a recent body of literature which addresses itself to the "potential richness" of the
process of litigation of important issues.
[One line of inquiry suggested by this literature] concerns the extent to which
procedures can be seen as servants of important individual values other than
the assurance of accurate determinations of guilt. Several possibilities appear.
The educative role of procedures can be stressed. On this view, the individual's
involvement in the criminal process is an opportunity for tutoring in the legitimate exercise of power, in which the state, through the proliferation of procedures that allow the defendant to act and speak, evidences the "commitment
to real dialogue," which is at the heart both of political legitimacy and communal existence. Or a cathartic function might be emphasized, whereby the
criminal process is seen as an opportunity for the redirection or channeling of
aggression through the provision of a full and fairly even contest between the
individual and the state. The role of procedure as an opportunity for
autonomous, self-determining activity by the individual might be explored. In
this view, the goal of the process is to ensure the fullest possible opportunity for
participation by the individual in the decisions that affect him.
Chase, supra note 342, at 596 n.420 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The same
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The attitude that has provided the basis of judicial immunity is the negative aspect of individualism, the attitude that is
opposed to sharing the loss of an injured party by shifting it to
another. The attitude of courts toward injured parties generally
has varied through time, but their attitude toward those who
have been injured by judges has largely been one of unconcerm
This attitude has been motivated by certain aspects of the judicial liability problem and the judicial system generally. First, a
distinction can be made between the ideology appropriate to the
realm of private relations and the ideology appropriate to the area
of the judicial process. The internal functioning of the judicial
system is uniquely the realm of legal justice. The conception of
the process is individualist, even though the results may be altruist, and the coerced sharing by a judge of a party's loss would not
be a likely prospect, even for reviewing judges who otherwise
exhibited strong altruist tendencies. Second, individualism is
expressed in the failure of the judge to identify with the interests
of the injured plaintiff. In most of the cases, there is a quite clear
lack of empathy, which is, of course, an altruist characteristic,
between the reviewing court and the injured victim. Finally, to
the extent that sympathy for the victim is expressed, contrary
policy arguments concerning mainly systemic and professional
interests and leading to the limitation of altruist tendencies are
forcefully asserted and relied on as the basis of decision.
As we know, injured parties have not been denied a remedy
entirely, but even the extension of a remedy to them has had an
individualist basis. Judges recognized that total immunity would
be unacceptable, in part because of an altruist perception of the
values, of course, can be expressed in non-criminal litigation, especially in judicial liability cases that share the possibilities of developing issues of political legitimacy and the
relationship between the citizen and the state.
There is an obvious link between this approach and the analysis of individualism and
altruism presented in the text. The process orientation is consistent with altruist concern
and inconsistent with individualist rigidity. Interestingly, Chase criticizes the current
Supreme Court for its lack of concern for such issues, id. at 596-97, as we have criticized
it for its individualist lack of concern in the judicial liability area.
The works cited by Chase are J. MACMURRAY, THE SEuF As AGENT (1957); Ball, Judicial
Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IowA L. Rav. 1059 (1974); Ball, The Play's the
Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on CourtsUnder the Rubric of Theater,28 STAN. L. Rv.
81 (1975); Griffiths, Ideology in CriminalProcedureor a Third "Model" of the Criminal
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970); Linde, Judges, Criticsand the Realist Tradition,82 YALE
L.J. 277 (1972); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 269 (1975);
Note, Plea Bargainingand the Transformationof the CriminalProcess, 90 HARV. L. Rv.
564 (1977). See also J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw 1-28 (1976).
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harm actually or potentially caused by judicial wrongdoing, and
in part because of the demands of a formally rational legal system. This perception, however, was that the problem was one
caused by lower judges and the doctrinal response was directed
at them. The nature of the higher judges' response, the way in
which they imposed liability, showed no real concern for the situation of the lower judge. Instead, it represented the creation of a
blanket rule which sometimes provided a remedy for the injured
party, but practically never allowed a careful and concerned inquiry into the just resolution of a particular case. No attempt was
made to assess the difficulties of the judge's position or his state
of mind.
Over time, however, the alternative process did develop. In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, little altruism
was shown for the injured parties, but the unfairness of the situation of the lower judge became apparent, in large part because the
reviewing judges more easily empathized with the position of the
defendant judges. The combination of the two tendencies resulted in an expansion of immunity to protect lower judges, but
provided no more succor to injured plaintiffs, showing a particularized kind of altruism.
The link between form and substance should now be apparent. The strong individualist emphasis in the law of judicial liability provides an explanation more broad than one of tactical
choice for the courts' rule preference in the area. The rule form,
the form that obviates resort to questions of policy and substantive justice, is supportive of the underlying attitude. The rule, in
form as well as substance, well expresses the stiff, unconcerned
approach of the courts to the entire area.
Examination of the majority opinion in Stump v.
Sparkman397 provides illustration. The opinion3 98 approaches the
individualist pole of the continuum. The harm to Sparkman was
fortuitous and fortuitous harm frequently must be borne alone.
No shifting of the loss to Judge Stump is necessary or appropriate
because of the damage the potential of liability could inflict on
the judicial system. The vision of the good society embodied in
the opinion is an individualist vision, with little concern for the
misfortunes of others. The form in which the expression is made
397. 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978).
398. Recall that altruism and individualism characterize the argument but not the
person making the argument. See notes 392-93 and accompanying text supra.
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is the rule form. The initial statement of the rule seems open, but
the interpretation closes the possibilities significantly, for, as the
dissents make clear, immunity will be granted in practically
every case under Justice White's formulation; the dissenters' resort to the underlying policies is rejected.
The contemporary alternative to this approach may be
drawn from several commentaries 99 and cases, including the Seventh Circuit decision in Stump"' and the Court of Appeal decision in Sirros v. Moore.4"' Advocates of that alternative perceive
the difficulties and contradictions in the area, but are willing to
resort to policy objectives to resolve them. Recognizing the
judge's legitimate need for freedom from harassment, they also
perceive a need to limit the judge's protection and to compensate
injured parties. Despite the cost to the judicial system, the sense
of injustice demands that judicial wrongs be righted. The usual
resolution is to immunize the judge who has acted as a judge; that
is, according to normal procedural standards in good faith. Such
a standard shows concern for both injured plaintiff and defendant
judge, and advocates believe it best reconciles the policy conflict.
Such a test, of course, may produce the consequences that
the Stump test successfully avoids. Any test that requires inquiry
into the judge's state of mind significantly increases the costs to
the legal system. What we have, then, is another value conflict.
The Stump majority values compensating harm and sanctioning
wrongful conduct much less, and the smooth functioning of the
judicial system much more, than the advocates of the alternative
do. That value choice now may be seen in the context of the larger
ideological conflict of individualism and altruism. But, as before,
the antinomy of reason and value remains. We can no more rationally and convincingly argue for altruism over individualism
than we can for the lesser value choice of the preferred doctrine
of judicial liability, but we can reject the inevitability of the
subjective and arbitrary nature of the problem because of the
possibility of forging a legal order and a social order that will
fulfill the vision of the altruist ideal.112 Such a legal order would
399. See sources cited at note 4 supra.
400. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977).
401. [1975] 1 Q.B. 118 (C.A.).
402. One criticism directed at this approach concerns the difficulty of acting on
altruist principles in a largely individualist world. These critics disagree with the statement in the text urging the rejection of individualist behavior on the ground that much
of value has developed out of individualism. For example, critics point out, cherished First
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care for those injured by its agents and would not shrink from
righting judicial wrongs for reasons of convenience. Even when
the costs to others are too great to give a remedy to one injured
party, this legal order would recognize and grapple with the injustice, rather than pretending it did not exist. In the judicial liability area, as elsewhere, remedying injustice is the way to justice.
Each action taken, by judge and scholar, that rejects as unjust
the individualist compromise and instead affirms the validity of
the altruist ideal in the face of the contradictions of the legal
order is an affirmation of the possibility of overcoming those contradictions in theory and in life. Each such judicial action has an
immediate impact in remedying a concrete injustice" 3 and, in our
current state of legal development, each such affirmation, judicial or scholarly, has great symbolic power as well.
Amendment protections of free speech and free exercise of religion grew out of the individualist conception of the independent position of the individual vis--vis the state. While
we recognize the strength of this criticism, we do not regard it as fatal to the altruistic
approach. No truly desirable concept that has developed in the context of individualism
is inconsistent with altruism. Free speech, for example, reflects an altruist belief in the
dignity of the individual and the importance of individual participation in the growth of
shared values as much as an individualist belief in self-reliance. Contrary to common
belief, communitarianism is entirely consistent with human dignity. See, e.g., K. Marx,
Economic and PhilosophicManuscripts, in WIrINos OF THE YOUNG MARX ON PmLOSOP1iY
AND Socwry 283-337 (L. Easton & K. Guddat eds. 1967). See generallyB. OLLMAN, ALIENATION: MARX'S CONCEPTION OF MAN IN CAPITALIST SocIErY (1971). The difficulty arises

mainly because of the impossibility of describing at present a world which has yet to come
into being, and of acting on the principles that will govern that world when we live in a
world of people not yet persuaded of their validity. Nevertheless, part of the process of
creating that world is the affirmation of its possibility, as stated in the text, even in the
face of such criticism.
403. Babylonian Talmud, Sabbath 10a. "Every judge who judges . . . [truthfully]
even for a single hour, the Writ gives him credit as though he had become a partner...
[with God] in the creation." Id. (Soncino Hebrew-English edition).
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